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This project establishes an analytical framework for identifying and discussing 
elements of logistics support of naval expeditionary forces. Although the findings have a 
broad application, focus is within the CENTCOM AOR. The research question is whether 
the existing logistics system is adequate for support of Naval Construction Forces (NCF), 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units, and 
Fleet Hospitals. 
Central to the study is the logistics system’s contextual factors, the system design 
and its output variables. Contextual factors such as economic and social trends and key 
success factors make demands and place constraints on the logistics system, whereas 
doctrine provides critical guidance and direction to the system. The logistics system’s 
design factors are its interdependent parts, meaning the tasks, technology, structures, 
people and processes that produce the goods and services. Finally, the output variables 
are the system’s products, how it performs and how effective it is.  
The project’s goal is to identify potential areas within the NAVCENT logistics 
chain for improvement, restructuring, or realignment to better support the expeditionary 
units in the region. The project is sponsored by the Naval Operational Logistics Support 
Center, a newly created organization that serves as the focal point for operational 
logistics in the Navy and Marine Corps. 
A key finding is that the NAVCENT logistics system is adequate, but inefficient. 
Adequacy points to the fact that the resources and capabilities are in place in theater, 
while the inefficiencies are explained by lack of execution. The report recommends 
increased integration, awareness and doctrinal understanding in order to improve the 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  OVERVIEW 
This report is an assessment of the logistics infrastructure supporting 
expeditionary units such as Naval Construction Force (NCF), Naval Special Warfare 
(NSW) Forces, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Units and Fleet Hospitals Elements. 
This research combines strategic, logistics, and supply chain management theory and 
practices to evaluate existing theater logistics capabilities and the requirements of the 
supported expeditionary units. Due to the current world situation and availability of 
information, this research is focused on the NAVCENT AOR.  Naval Operational 
Logistics Support Center (NOLSC), a newly created organization that serves as the focal 
point for operational logistics in the Navy and Marine Corps, is the sponsor for the 
project. 
The topic is important for several reasons. First, lessons learned from recent 
operations demonstrate that there is room for improvement in the existing logistic system. 
Second, the new threats and corresponding refinement of doctrine and concepts of 
operations lead to new requirements for logistics support, configuration of customers and 
service providers. Finally, these elements make command and control of logistics 
support, inter- and intra-theater, more complex. This research considers whether there is a 
need for a new, coordinating mechanism in the intra-theater logistics system to improve 
existing practices. 
Consequently, the research question asks whether there are potential areas within 
the NAVCENT logistics system to target for improvement, restructuring or realignment 
to better support the expeditionary units in the region.  The report is structured in four 
chapters.  This chapter provides an overview of the research.  Chapter II provides 





B.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Logistics support is critical for combat readiness and effectiveness. As a force 
multiplier in military operations, the structure and quality of this logistics support system 
influences the War-fighter’s ability to execute their mission and achieve their military 
objective. Military logisticians are faced with delivering the right support in the right 
quantity at the right place and time with a reduced logistics footprint, operating in austere 
environments with limited infrastructure, and through a very complex logistics supply 
chain with a high degree of uncertainty/variability in demand and lead times, as the speed 
of advance of the operational forces increases with today’s technological advances. 
This research assesses the logistics system supporting naval expeditionary units in 
the NAVCENT AOR. Our research method included site visits, discussions, lessons 
learned collection and an extensive literature review.  This report addresses significant 
elements of the existing logistics system, including the roles and relationships of its 
service providers and customers, as described in existing Navy and joint doctrine. 
The existing research and knowledge base on Navy logistics systems covers a 
variety of relevant aspects of logistics support. However, a comprehensive approach to 
the structures and players within the system seems to be missing. Thus, this report 
combines strategic management, logistics, and supply chain management theories to 
provide relevant knowledge and recommendations for future improvements to the naval 
logistics support system for expeditionary forces. 
NOLSC identified a potential requirement to establish a logistics support 
mechanism to support integrated expeditionary units operating independently from the 
established theater logistics system.  In support of this, the research question is as 
follows: 
Is the existing Navy logistics system adequate to support naval expeditionary 
forces such as NCF, NSW, EOD and Fleet Hospitals? 
Based on an organizational system framework analysis, the report concludes with 
recommendations to better leverage existing resources and capabilities to improve and 
streamline an already professional system. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  LOGISTICS OVERVIEW  
The overall logistics system ensures that joint theater logistics is functioning 
efficiently.  A crucial element of the logistics system is the timely integration of the inter-
theater and intra-theater transportation of personnel, equipment and material to and 
within the theater. Rapid movement of these elements is essential to the success of 
operations in the field. The process begins in CONUS at the Point of Embarkation (POE) 
and ends in the operational areas within individual theaters. Before commencing 
operations, the combatant commander and logistics planners need to balance objectives, 
scheme of maneuver and operational timing with logistics capabilities in an effort to 
bridge any operational-logistic gap. The functions of logistics, extending operational 
reach, and applied operational logistics, shape and influence the effectiveness of the 
theater logistics system. As a note, specific considerations in developing a logistics 
system such as geography, transportation, logistics capability, logistics enhancement, 
logistics infrastructure protection, echelon of support, assignment of responsibility, and 
the availability of host-nation and allied support are not included in this discussion, 
although their overall importance in joint theater logistics should not be ignored. 
1. Functions of Logistics 
Six logistic functional areas influence the logistics system.  They are: Supply, 
Transportation, Civil Engineering, Health Services, Maintenance, and Other Services.  
Theater logistics support planers must consider all of these functions when developing a 
theater logistics support system. In general, combatant commanders plan and coordinate 
this system, while service component commanders provide services and execute the 
system. 
Combatant commanders and their planning staffs will determine and designate 
those categories of supplies and services that should be considered for common-user 
support. While designation of common-user support does not relieve components of 
providing Service-peculiar supplies and services, the staff assessment will identify 
economies resulting from consolidating resources or tasking one or more components to 
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provide common-user support to the remainder of the joint force.1 Common-user logistics 
sources of authority include DoD directives and instructions that assign common-user 
logistic executive agent responsibilities; Inter-Service support agreements (ISSAs); 
acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs); and combatant commander and 
subordinate Joint Force Commander (JFC) operational plans (OPLANS) and /or 
operation orders (OPORDs) and directives.2   
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command’s (USTRANSCOM) mission is to 
provide strategic common-user air, land and sea transportation to deploy, employ, sustain 
and redeploy military forces to meet national security objective across the range of 
military operations.3 It is comprised of the Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military 
Sealift Command (MSC), and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC). 
USTRANSCOM normally functions as the supporting command to the geographic 
commander and serves as the single manager for common-user ports.4 Each Service- 
specific theater distribution network will use organic transportation resources that are 
under the operational control of the theater Service component. Combatant commanders 
may request USTRANSCOM to operate dedicated express transportation to in-theater 
destinations different from usual aerial and surface points of debarkation. 
For brevity, this research paper limits the engineering planning discussion to the 
following areas only: Base Development, Facilities Construction and Base Maintenance 
and Assignment of Facilities. Combatant commanders are responsible for any base 
development necessary to accomplish the mission.5  Staff planners will assist the 
combatant commander with prioritizing, planning and coordinating the construction and 
maintenance of the logistics infrastructure necessary to support the mission. The 
assignment of facilities including facility acquisition and funding rests with the  
                                                   
1 US DoD, (2000), Joint Doctrine Publication 4-0, Logistics Support of Joint Operation.  
2 US DoD, (2001), Joint Doctrine Publication 4-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations. 




designated Service. Geographic combatant commanders should ensure that minimum 
essential engineering capabilities and facilities required to support theater operational and 
tactical requirements are assigned to the Service components.6 
Combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating and integrating health 
service support (HSS) within their respective theaters. Where practical, joint use of 
available medical assets will be accomplished to support the war-fighting strategy and 
concept of operations.7  They are also responsible for maintenance and salvage efforts in 
their theater of operations. Where practical, maintenance facilities for joint or cross-
Service use should be established and inter-Service use of salvage assets should be 
emphasized.8  However, Service component commanders should retain responsibility for 
Service specific item maintenance support. 
Other Logistic services include food service, exchange, billeting, textile, laundry 
and shower, religious, postal and finance. Each Service component commander will 
provide these services to personnel that fall under their command. 
2. Extending Operational Reach  
When the theater logistics system is developed and is operating efficiently, the 
planner may be faced with the need to extend capabilities. This scenario occurs when the 
operational forces actually extend their areas of operation, and is referred to as 
“operational reach.”  Operational reach is the distance over which the military forces are 
concentrated. It is vital that the operational and logistical elements understand 
“operational reach” and be in continuous communication. If the combat forces extended 
their reach and lines of communication (LOC) without the proper logistical support, the 
military advancement can fail. The logistical elements must be prepared to utilize all 
assets available to provide an adequate level of sustainment to combat forces. The 
operational reach of a force can be improved by establishing advanced bases and depots 
for material or by increasing the security and efficiency of the logistics process and 
LOCs.  
                                                   




3. Joint Theater Logistics 
Joint warfare requires unity of effort to maximize combat capability to achieve 
national objectives in the shortest time possible. The relative combat power that military 
forces can bring to bear against an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to plan 
for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to the required points of application 
across the range of military operations.9 Logistics planning is critical in support of 
military operations and must be considered at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. 
Combatant commanders, joint force and theater level service component commanders 
and support commands need to link strategic, operational and tactical level logistics to 
meet mission and operational tasking.  
Joint theater logistics is the concept of utilizing logistics resources to generate and 
support theater combat forces.  It is the responsibility of the combatant commander to 
ensure that the plan for using available resources is in balance with his operational plan. 
In doing so, the combatant commander can manage the gap between operations and 
logistics.  He does so by maintaining close cooperation between the two, as well as by 
fostering an understanding of the mission assigned.  
Although the Service component commanders provide logistics resources, the 
combatant commanders are responsible for ensuring that the overall plan for using these 
resources supports their theater concept of operations.10 
4. Naval Expeditionary Logistics 
Naval expeditionary logistics is about moving naval forces and sustaining their 
operations in a broad array of environments, including political and military, from benign 
environments with relatively well developed infrastructures to more stressful situations 
involving forcible entry and limited infrastructures.11 For the purpose of this report, the  
                                                   
9 US DoD, (2000), Joint Doctrine Publication 4-0, Logistics Support of Joint Operations. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Naval Studies Board (1999), Naval Expeditionary Logistics, Enabling Operational Maneuver From 
the Sea, http://www.books.nap.edu/html/naval. Retrieved on September 22, 2004. 
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research examines the following expeditionary forces: NSW, NCF, EOD and Fleet 
Hospitals with the intent of evaluating the theater logistics system supporting these 
specific forces. 
5. Operational Logistics 
Operational logistics affects the sustainability of expeditionary forces operating at 
the tactical level of war. It involves coordinating and providing intra-theater logistic 
resources to operating forces, and primarily concerns the Unified combatant commanders 
and the Service component commanders.12 At the operational level of logistic support, 
planners coordinate and execute the movement of material, equipment and personnel to 
provide indirect or direct war-fighter support to expeditionary forces so that that they can 
accomplish assigned tasks. In other words, operational logistics is delivering the right 
amount of supplies at the right time to support operations. It is accomplished by intra-
theater strategic movement to points of debarkation such as a naval logistics support hubs 
or nodes, intra-theater movement to distribution centers, and tactical movement and 
distribution to expeditionary force end users by air, land and/or sea modes of 
transportation. Effective operational logistics enables the logistics system to be 
responsive and adaptive and extends the operational reach of expeditionary forces at-sea 
or ashore.  
Applied Operational Logistics encompasses logistics as a force multiplier, a 
deterrent, and a contributor to flexibility. Any small advantage gained over the enemy 
can prove to be extremely beneficial as a force multiplier. Logistics plays an important 
role in obtaining that advantage by reducing support and response times and increasing 
force sustainment. For example, logistics elements that are deployed with the initial 
combat forces will enable those forces to quickly become operationally ready-for-combat 
and will enhance the sustainment of those forces to project power in the early stages of an 
operation. U.S. military presence in itself can be used as a sign of deterrence. The use of 
Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and the pre-positioning of ships near the AOR can deter 
opposing forces from entering the conflict. These logistical forces symbolize how quickly 
logistics can be on the scene to support the combat forces. Lastly, logistics can contribute 
                                                   
12 US DoN, (1995), Naval Doctrine Publication 4 Naval Logistics. 
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considerably to a Commander’s flexibility. If the logistics planner has infrastructures, 
contracts and host nation agreements in place before a conflict begins, the combatant 
commander’s operational flexibility will be enhanced, allowing him to have the 
maximum forces available for combat operations. More importantly, the logistics planner 
must remain flexible throughout the conflict, by anticipating and providing support for 
the next phase in the operational plan. It is imperative for the logistics planner to consider 
the effects that failure, success, and change have on the logistics system. Developing this 
flexibility is crucial because the management of change is the key to timely support and 
response.13 
B.  NAVAL FORCES, CENTRAL COMMAND, LOGISTICS SYSTEM 
Theater transportation and distribution is a critical link in getting material from 
major supply depots, bases, and manufacturers in the United States to the front-line war-
fighter. The Navy faces the challenge of providing a robust transportation network 
capable of supplying naval forces at sea or deployed on shore. Post September 11th, Navy 
forces have taken on the expanded role of shore basing expeditionary forces in support of 
all operational levels in the combined, joint and Service related environments.14 To do 
this, NAVCENT has developed a complex theater transportation network with elements 
of strategic and operational transportation on the sea, in the air, and on land. Within the 
naval component, NAVCENT exercises control over naval logistics through its 
subordinate command, Commander, Logistics Forces, U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command (COMLOGFORNAVCENT) and Commander, Task Force FIVE THREE 
(CTF-53).  CTF-53 Operations established priorities15 for all material movement within 
NAVCENT, including that moved by air. 
COMLOGFORNAVCENT is an Echelon III command reporting directly to 
NAVCENT and is assigned duties as Commander, Task Force FIVE THREE (CTF-53) 
                                                   
13 US DoD, (2000), Joint Doctrine Publication 4-0, Logistics Support of Joint Operations. 
14 US DoN, (1999), Naval Warfare Publication 4-01.1, Naval Expeditionary Shore Based Logistic 
Support And Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, And Integration Operations. 
15 Pike, J. (n.d.) Commander Logistics Force (COMLOGNAVFORCENT) Commander, Task Force 
53 (CTF-53). http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/ctf-53.htm.  Retrieved on July 22, 2004. 
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within the NAVCENT Task Force organization.16  COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53 is 
headquartered in Manama, Bahrain, the logistics hub in the NAVCENT AOR. The 
organization is responsible for all operational logistics in support of the naval forces 
operating within the CENTCOM AOR. This AOR includes approximately 7.5 million 
square miles and encompasses eastern Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia. The 
mission of COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53 is to integrate and coordinate logistics for 
theater operations during peacetime and war.17  
COMLOGFORNAVCENT has developed a robust capability of supporting 
operational logistics within the CENTCOM AOR by means of a mature distribution 
network that includes air, land and sea transportation modes. Within this theater 
distribution network there are permanent and temporary air, land and sea distribution 
nodes that facilitate the timely movement of passengers, mail and cargo to end user units.  
Combined Task Force FIVE THREE (CTF-53) provides operational logistics in support 
of all naval units assigned to the NAVCENT AOR. They are assigned tactical control of 
maritime logistics support assets and administer the naval intra-theater air and surface 
logistics distribution network. They act as the service provider for fuel, food provisions, 
procurement and contracting and ship’s maintenance. CTF-53 is also responsible for 
providing oversight, tracking and expediting of high priority parts for surface and 
aviation units, ordnance management, hazardous material management and general 
aviation support. COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53 is comprised of Combined Task 
Group (CTG 53.x) organizations, as depicted in Figure 1, which are responsible for 
accomplishing theater-wide missions. 
 
                                                   
16 Ibid. 
17 Nash, M. (2000), COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53…Integrated Logistics for USN/USMC Forces 
in the NAVCENT AOR, Supply Corps News Letter, 1, 






























Figure 1.   COMLOGFORNAVCENT Organizational Chart 
 
CTG-53.0, the Naval Support Activity facilities manager, is responsible for all 
operational and administrative functions assigned by the Naval Support Activity, 
Commanding Officer. 
CTG-53.1, the Afloat Force Logistics Coordinator (AFLC), is usually the on 
station T-AFS. The AFLC employs and monitors Force Logistics Coordinator (FLC) 
policy and guidance in the coordination with afloat Task Forces or Task Group 
commanders.  
CTG-53.2, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) South West Asia Commanding 
Officer, provides oversight to USNS Combat Logistics Force ships and various 
oceanographic survey vessels. 
CTG-53.3, the Ship Repair Coordinator Officer-In-Charge of Ship Repair Unit 
Bahrain, coordinates all in-theater ship repair and technician assist visits. 
CTG-53.4, the Naval Regional Contracting Center (NRCC) liaison Officer-In-
Charge of the Bahrain detachment, provides contracting and procurement support for 
naval units deployed in NAVCENT. 
CTG-53.5, the Naval Air Logistics Coordination Center Southwest Asia (NALCC 
SWA), provides and maintains the air logistics system for NAVCENT.  
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CTG-53.6, the Towing and Salvage Officer, is primarily responsible for all 
towing and salvaging operations in NAVCENT. 
CTG-53.8 is assigned by COMLOGFORNAVCENT to execute special missions. 
CTG-53.9, the Afloat Pre-positioning Ship Squadron Commodore, commands a 
squadron of MSC vessels with a load-out of pre-positioned war material used by the 
United States forces. 
C.  NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 
Naval expeditionary forces are those Navy and Marine Corps forces that are self-
reliant, self-sustaining and capable of conducting operations in the most austere 
environments. They are tailored economical force packages that can accomplish the 
mission without having to wait for additional assets or personnel.18 
1. Naval Special Warfare (NSW) 
NSW Forces serve as the Navy component to U.S. Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM).  As the Naval Component to SOCOM, Naval Special Warfare Command 
(NAVSPECWARCOM) is composed of approximately 5,400 active and reserve 
operational and support personnel, which include Naval Special Warfare Groups 
(NSWG), Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) Teams, and 
Special Boat Teams (SBT)19 (See Figure 2). NSW manning levels will increase 6% to 
8% in FY 05 and 06. Their mission is to provide vision, leadership, doctrinal guidance, 
resources and oversight to ensure component maritime special operations forces are ready 
to meet the operational requirements of combatant commanders.20 These forces are 
primarily responsible for the following mission areas which are prioritized by the 
respective geographical combatant commander in which the missions are executed:  
                                                   
18 Secretary of the Navy. (1996). Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 
http://www.nova.edu/library/dils/lessons/apa/print.htm.  Retrieved on July 22, 2004. 
19 US Naval War College, (2003), Joint Military Operations Reference Guide, Forces/Capabilities 
Handbook.  
20 US DoN, Naval Special Warfare Command Web Site. (n.d.), Naval Special Warfare Command, 
http://www.navsoc.navy.mil/navsoc_missions.asp.  Retrieved on July 29, 2004. 
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special reconnaissance, direction action, unconventional warfare, information warfare, 
counter-drug operations, personnel recovery, hydrographic reconnaissance, foreign 
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Figure 2.   NSW Organizational Chart 
 
a. Community Organization 
NSW forces are organized into four operational components better known 
as NSWGs and are located on both the East and West Coast.  Each NSWG must train, 
equip, deploy and support forces to conduct regular deployments, exercises, and 
contingency operations for theater Combatant Commanders.21 They maintain operational 
control over assigned CONUS-based NSW forces and administrative control over all 
assigned forces as echelon III commanders within the Navy chain of command.22  
Each NSWG is comprised of various teams, units and elements with 
tailored capabilities and support functions that shape the overall NSWG organization. 
SEAL Teams are CONUS-based commands established to train, equip, deploy and 
support SEAL platoons to conduct NSW in support of joint and fleet commanders. Each 
                                                   




Team is comprised of eight platoons composed of two officers and 14 enlisted special 
operations personnel and requisite support personnel.23 SDV Teams are regionally 
oriented based commands established to operate, deploy, support and maintain 
submersible systems that deliver and recover special operations forces (SOF) in hostile or 
denied areas and conduct limited reconnaissance and direct action missions.24 Normally, 
each team is comprised of a headquarters and support element and three task units. SB 
Teams are CONUS based commands established to operate, deploy, support, and 
maintain special operations craft to provide maritime mobility for SOF.25  Their missions 
include SEAL insertion and extraction support, coastal patrol and interdiction, riverine 
warfare and other support operations.26 Also, assigned to each of the Groups are Naval 
Special Warfare Units, which are small command and control elements, located outside 
CONUS that primarily support those NSW forces that are assigned to theater special 
operations commands such as SOCCENT or components of naval task forces. Logistics 
Support Units (LOGSU) are also regionally-oriented on the East and West Coast and 
provide full logistics support to their respective NSWG and its components in direct 
support of NSW operations. As service providers, LOGSUs perform integrated logistics 
support in the following functional areas: supply, combat service support, contracting 
service, combat systems, facilities management, medical, communications and 
transportation. For the purposes of this report, the Naval Special Warfare Development 
Group and Naval Special Warfare Center are not discussed although we do not want to 
underscore the importance of these organizations and the contributions they make to the 
NSW community. 
2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
EOD units are an integral element of the Navy’s expeditionary forces. The 
community consists of approximately 2,000 men and women, who are trained to tackle 
the global spectrum of threats, from conventional ordnance to nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons. 






More specifically, EOD units are trained to execute four general categories of 
missions throughout the world. That is, to enhance ship war fighting abilities and 
survivability through integration into Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups, conduct 
Mine Countermeasure operations, support US Secret Service and FBI missions, and 
operate and maintain the fleet’s various Marine Mammal Systems which conduct mine 
countermeasures, port security and underwater object location operations. Currently, US 
Navy has ten active units, four reserve units and two training units. 
a. Community Organization 
The Navy’s operational EOD force is organized at three levels; groups 
(EODGRUs), mobile units (EODMUs) and detachments (EOD DETS). The community 
is divided into two groups, with EODGRU ONE at San Diego, California (Naval 
Amphibious Base Coronado) and EODGRU TWO at Norfolk, Virginia (Naval 
Amphibious Base Little Creek). EOD GRU ONE reports to the Commander, Naval 
Surface Forces Pacific, whereas EODGRU TWO reports to the Commander, Naval 
Surface Forces Atlantic.  
Each group has several mobile units and detachments located at naval 
facilities throughout its AOR. Under deployment, individual units and detachments come 
under operational command of regional commanders-in-chief and supporting command 
organizations.  
Additionally, each EOD Group has a training and evaluation unit 
(EODTEU) to provide advanced training in render-safe, diving, demolition and mobility 
techniques and to evaluate new tactics, techniques, tools and procedures. 
The active-force EOD detachment is the basic operational unit, comprising 
Mobile, Shore-Based, Mine Countermeasures and Marine Mammal Systems teams. All 
are structured for rapid “fly-away” responses to emergencies. There are also three types 
of Naval Reserve Force (NRF) detachments. That is, Ordnance Clearance, Area Search 

















































Figure 3.   EODGRU Organizational Chart27 
 
3. Naval Construction Force (NCF) 
The Naval Construction Force (NCF), or SEABEE’s, is the combat civil 
engineering component of the Navy.  The SEABEE’s provide expeditionary civil 
engineering and combat construction to Navy and Marine Corps operating forces28, 
including horizontal and vertical construction, construction and operation of 
expeditionary facilities, amphibious and underwater construction, expeditionary logistics 
over the shore, and defensive combat capability. 
NCF units deploy independently or in support of other forces, performing civil 
engineering and construction projects in support of combat operations, forward basing, 
civil reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance.  Focused on supporting a “customer,” 
much of the NCF’s deployed operations are in support of other forces, such as the Marine 
Corps, Naval Special Warfare, Fleet Hospitals, Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary 
aviation units, and the Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Force.  In the joint arena, 
NCF units can support combat forces of other services, at the discretion of a theater 
combatant commander, or other governmental agencies outside of the Department of 
Defense, as well as provide humanitarian assistance to local foreign nationals. 
 
                                                   
27 US DoN, Expeditionary Support Policy Council, (2004), MARFPCOM Brief. 
28 US DoN, Naval Facility Engineering Command brief, (2004), SEABEE Resources and Logistics 
(SRL). 
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a. Community Organization 
The Naval Construction Force is organized under the 1st Naval 
Construction Division (1 NCD), based in Norfolk, Virginia.  As the type commander for 
the SEABEE’s, the Division’s commander also holds the title of Commander, Naval 
Construction Force.  The Force is divided between one active regiment in the Atlantic 
and Pacific Fleets, and four more regiments in the Naval Reserve.  Most Atlantic Fleet 
units are based in Gulfport, Mississippi, under the command of the 22nd Naval 
Construction Regiment (22 NCR) at Norfolk, Virginia.  Pacific Fleet units are based in 
Port Hueneme, California, and under the command of 30 NCR at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.  
Two SEABEE Readiness Groups (SRG) also provide training, logistics, and mobilization 
support to NCF units in Gulfport and Port Hueneme. 
Within the regiments, the main operational NCF unit is the Naval Mobile 
Construction Battalion (NMCB).  There are four Construction Battalions in each 
regiment, as well as twelve more in the Naval Reserve.  Other deploying units include 
Underwater Construction Teams (UCT) and Amphibious Construction Battalions (ACB), 
with one of each based at Little Creek, Virginia, and Coronado, California.  The Naval 
Reserve provides Naval Construction Force Support Units (NCFSU) and Construction 
Battalion Maintenance Units (CBMU) for logistics and maintenance support to the active 
battalions when deployed.  Finally, Construction Battalion Units (CBU) are non-
deploying units disbursed at various fleet bases to provide local, organic construction and 
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Figure 4.   NCF Organizational Chart 
 
 
The systems command for the NCF is the Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command (NAVFAC), based in Norfolk.  NAVFAC provides support for all civil 
engineering and construction functions within the Navy, including military construction, 
public works, and combat engineering and construction.  Naval Facilities Expeditionary 
Logistics Center (NFELC), at Port Hueneme, provides materiel, life cycle support, and 
training development to support the Naval Construction Force and other naval 
expeditionary units.  NFELC manages over $1 billion in inventory in support of SEABEE 
operations, including procurement and sustainment of Civil Engineering Support 
Equipment (CESE), logistics information systems, Class IV building materials, weapons, 
personal combat equipment, and Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) equipment.  
NFELC is the main point for coordination of logistics support for deployed NCF units, 
including mobilization, sustainment while deployed, redeployment, and demobilization. 
SRG  SEABEE Readiness Group 
NCR  Naval Construction Regiment 
NMCB Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 
CBU  Construction Battalion Unit 
UCT  Underwater Construction Team 
 
NOTE: Units from the 1st, 3rd, 7th and 9th NCR are 
reserve units. 
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4. Fleet Hospitals 
The Fleet Hospital’s primary mission is to provide a standardized, modular, 
flexible ashore combat service support medical/dental capability to support Marine Corps 
Air/Ground Task Forces deployed ashore, naval amphibious task force units deployed 
ashore, and forward deployed Navy elements of the Fleet, Army, and Air Force units 
deployed ashore.  Operations are governed by the principles of the “Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in Armed Forces in the 
field of August 12, 1949.”29  As a secondary mission, the Fleet Hospital is capable of 
providing hospital services for use by U.S. government agencies involved in disaster or 
humanitarian relief or limited humanitarian care incident to these missions or peacetime 
military operations. 
Fleet Hospitals deploy as medical facilities capable of performing level three 
medical care in designated non-combat zones. Level three medical care is defined as 
clinical care normally found in a facility that is typically located in a reduced-level enemy 
threat environment, has equipment and staffing to provide resuscitation, initial wound 
surgery and postoperative treatment. Level three facilities may be the first step toward 
restoration of functional health, as compared to procedures that stabilize a condition to 
prolong life.30 
a. Community Organization 
The Fleet Hospital program is comprised of 6 active duty and 2 reserve 
manpower units. Active duty units are based out of the following naval hospitals: 
Bremerton, Jacksonville, Pensacola, Portsmouth, Camp Lejuene, and Camp Pendelton.  
When not in a deployed status, these Fleet Hospital units work for their respective naval 
hospital facilities and follow their duty station’s chain of command. The two reserve units 
are based out of naval hospitals Great Lakes and Dallas. In a non-deployment status, 
these units fall under their local reserve center and regional reserve readiness command 
for administrative support. 
                                                   
29 US DoN, (1998), OPNAVINST 3501.176B Projected Operational Environment for Navy Fleet 
Hospitals. 
30 US DoN, (1995), Naval Warfare Publication 4-02.4 Part A, Fleet Hospitals. 
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The Fleet Hospital commands consist of over 1,000 medical, dental, 
supply and construction battalion personnel and have the capability to build and maintain 
a 500 bed hospital, which includes six operating tables (three O.R. shelters with two 
tables each), laboratory, radiology, X-ray, pharmacy, triage, biomedical repair, 
Preventive Medicine, Central Sterilization, troop housing, and galley facilities.31 These 
units deploy with all medical and construction equipment and supply consumables 
required to build, operate and, maintain a fully functional medical center capable of 
providing level three medical care for the first thirty days of operation, with the exception 
of the hospital’s fuel and water requirements which are provided by designated logistical 
support elements in-theater. 
D.  SUMMARY 
Military logisticians are faced with delivering the right support with the right 
quantity at the right place and time in a reduced logistics footprint, operating in austere 
environments with limited infrastructure and a logistics supply chain that is very complex 
with a high demand of uncertainty/variability and longer than usual lead times as the 
speed of advance of the operational forces increases with today’s technological advances. 
The following chapter provides a gap analysis of naval expeditionary community 
requirements and the logistics system capabilities to meet these requirements using the 
Organizational Systems Framework. 
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III.  SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
A.  THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 
The model for this analysis is the Organizational Systems Framework (OSF)32.  It 
describes the organization as an open system with interdependent parts that should be 
well aligned and with congruent parts. Accordingly, misaligned parts reduce system 
efficiency and effectiveness.  This report focuses on the Navy logistics system as the unit 
of analysis. 
The system perspective is based on a number of assumptions. First, it assumes 
that there is constant interaction between the organization as a system and its 
environment. As the environment changes, the organization must also adapt to survive 
and vice versa. Second, organizational survival depends on converting environmental 
inputs into organizational outputs. This conversion process is referred to as throughput 
and describes how the organization and its design factors transform energy and 
information from inputs to outputs. Third, organizational outputs provide feedback to 
judge organizational performance. Output is defined as culture, basic goods or services 
and goal attainment. Finally, changes in one part of the system have effects throughout 
the organization.  In other words, interventions create ripple effects independent of the 












Figure 5.   A Basic Outline of the Organizational Systems Framework 
                                                   
32 Roberts, N., Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, (2004), Strategic Management Lecture, 
Organizational Systems Framework. 
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B.  INPUTS TO THE SYSTEM 
An analysis based on the OSF starts with mapping out the inputs to the logistics 
system. System inputs can be viewed as the factors that make up the givens facing the 
organization. They are the material that the organization has to work with, and represent 
three main categories.  First, one considers the external environment and context in which 
the organization operates. Next, the key factors for measuring success are identified and 
understood. Finally, every system will get implicit or explicit direction from external 
forces or stakeholders.  A proper analysis will consider this direction and its impact on 
the organization’s fundamental parts. The subsequent section elaborates on these input 
variables. The terms “system” and “organization” are used interchangeably, and have the 
same meaning. 
1. Environment and Context 
The environment in which a system operates is made of various external factors 
and influences.  Some of these are physical, such as the climate and physical 
environment.  Others are less substantive, such as political, economic, social, and 
technological trends that influence the organization or the industry it operates in. 
When considering the logistics system supporting naval expeditionary forces, the 
physical environment is that of combat operations while deployed ashore in the Central 
Command area of responsibility.  This environment provides two specific influences on 
the logistics system.  First, the physical hazard of combat is a factor that can adversely 
affect the efficiency of the system.  Second, deployed operations ashore mean that the 
customer, i.e., the expeditionary forces, is operating away from their normal lines of 
supply. 
An optimal logistics system relies on clear and speedy lines of communication 
and distribution.  However, force protection requirements in a combat zone further 
degrade and complicate the system.  For example, physical lines of distribution should be 
direct from source to destination by the shortest possible route.  This is not always 
possible in a combat zone, where routes may need to vary for unpredictability, or take 
detours around trouble spots.  Furthermore, physical destruction of shipments produces 
an even greater variability on delivery time. 
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Combat operations affect variability of demand, also.  Most demand models are 
based on relatively consistent usage patterns.  For example, spare parts consumption for 
equipment is based on failure rates over a given period of operating hours or cycles.  
Anticipated operating tempo (operating hours per day, month, etc.), or OPTEMPO, can 
help predict how many parts may be needed for a given deployment.  However, combat 
conditions can produce much greater variability in this operating tempo, making accurate 
predictions much more difficult.  Furthermore, OPTEMPO itself can be variable as units 
surge forward on an offensive, and then bed down for a period of relative inactivity.  In 
addition, combat losses and battle damage repair can create a demand for material that is 
very different from peacetime demands, and very difficult to predict through modeling or 
other forecasting techniques. 
All of these changes are compounded when the expeditionary forces are deployed 
away from their normal sources of logistics support.  The existing processes and 
relationships they rely on in homeport may be different or non-existent when deployed to 
NAVCENT.  New relationships must be established and new processes learned.  The 
change also affects the NAVCENT service providers, as they now support different 
customers than they may be normally accustomed to. 
Other environmental factors may be more broad-based and strategic.  For 
example, current trends and initiatives in the Department of Defense, such as 
Transformation, have an impact on this system.  The requirements for “Jointness” in 
interoperability and other aspects also influence the logistics system.  Finally, budget 
constraints are a constant fact that must be dealt with. 
All of these aspects of the external environment will be discussed in greater detail 
later in the analysis, as they relate to the alignment of the system’s parts or its overall 
execution. 
2. Key Success Factors 
The key success factors represent critical, agreed-upon measures that ensure that 
the organization meets the demands and constraints it faces. These factors support the  
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system direction, and can be viewed as tenets in the daily operations.  The system’s 
design and its intended results must incorporate the success factors in order to be 
successful. 
In the case of the logistics system, these factors are to get the RIGHT STUFF to 
the RIGHT PLACE at the RIGHT TIME to the RIGHT COST.  Given the scope of this 
project, the cost dimension will not be analyzed. The “right stuff” means the right mix of 
goods, services, or other logistics support, in the right quantity to meet the customer’s 
needs.  The “right place” means not only delivering to the customer, but having strategic 
warehousing and distribution points that will make delivery over that last tactical mile 
easier and more predictable.  This helps ensure that those goods and services will be there 
at the “right time” when they are needed. 
These success factors come from accepted logistics theory, and are not unique to 
military logistics.  However, the constraints and demands placed on a military logistics 
system in combat create new and unique challenges for satisfying these key success 
factors.  These unique demands and constraints will be discussed further as they relate to 
the implementation of the system design and its ultimate results. 
3. System Direction 
Based on the environmental and key success factors, the last input variable is the 
system direction.  System direction can come from various sources and can be targeted at 
various levels and segments of the system.  It can be positive, giving open authority and 
discretion to the organization’s leaders to implement the system as they see fit.  It can 
also be restrictive, holding those leaders to conform in some way to a pre-determined set 
of rules or standards.   
System direction can take the form of mandates, values, or missions that are 
explicitly stated or implicitly assumed.  Moreover, strategic issues, policies, visions, or 




When analyzing the logistics system supporting naval expeditionary forces, that 
system direction comes from several levels.  Strategic vision comes from the President, 
Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, or the Chief of Naval Operations.  Most of this 
direction is not focused on expeditionary support or even logistics specifically.  This 
strategic vision gives direction to the military and DoD in general.  However, they all 
have direct impacts on the system put in place to support naval expeditionary forces.  For 
example, the President’s focus on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) implies a 
certain direction for logistics planners in terms of the types of operations they must be 
capable of supporting, the environments they will be working in, etc.  Other policies, 
such as jointness, outline very specific requirements that the logistics system must fulfill. 
The next level of system direction is doctrine.  Logistics doctrine exists at various levels, 
including joint doctrine, service-specific doctrine, and community-specific doctrines form 
the various expeditionary communities.  Applicable doctrine covers not only logistics, 
but also the operational doctrine of how these forces are employed in combat operations.  
For example, doctrine for the Naval Construction Forces calls for their Battalions to come 
under the operational control of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) or Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF) commander.  Such operational doctrine can drive logistics 
system planning and implementation. 
In considering the NAVCENT logistics system, one must first understand the 
hierarchy of forces within NAVCENT, and NAVCENT’s role as a service component 
commander under the theater combatant commander, CENTCOM.  Joint doctrine 
discusses in detail the division of responsibility between the combatant commander and 
the service component commander regarding logistics support.  Since combatant 
commanders exercise command authority over assigned forces within their geographic 
AOR, they are overall responsible for joint theater logistics and maintain directive 
authority for logistics. This directive authority ensures the effective execution of 
approved operation plans, the effectiveness and economy of the operation, and the 
prevention or elimination of unnecessary facility duplication and overlapping functions.33  
Combatant commanders are responsible for reviewing each Service component 
                                                   
33 US DoD, (2000), Joint Doctrine Publication 4-0, Logistics Support of Joint Operations. 
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commanders’ specific requirements and establishing priorities in support of strategic 
objectives. Combatant commanders are also responsible for managing resource allocation 
and supply support among the Service components. Further, the combatant commander is 
responsible for a distribution network, maintenance, salvage, construction facilities 
engineering, base development, coordinating health services, and other services.34  
Military Services, U.S. Special Operations Command (for special operations 
specific logistics) and Service component commanders are responsible for the 
implementation and execution of all logistics functional areas. In addition, each Service is 
responsible for the logistics support of its own forces and direct communication with 
appropriate headquarters on all supply matters, except when the logistics support is 
otherwise provided for by assignments to common, joint, or cross-servicing.35 However, 
combatant commanders may determine that common servicing is ideal and will assign 
responsibility for providing or coordinating service for all military components in a 
designated operational area to the dominant user of that service.  
Combatant commanders are responsible for any base development necessary to 
accomplish the mission.36  Staff planners will assist the combatant commander with 
prioritizing, planning and coordinating the construction and maintenance of the logistics 
infrastructure necessary to support the mission. The assignment of facilities including 
facility acquisition and funding rests with the designated Service. Combatant 
commanders should ensure that minimum essential engineering capabilities and facilities 
required to support theater operational and tactical requirements are assigned to the 
Service components.37 
The proper management of joint logistics is a complex, interdependent process 
that may apply leverage (plus or minus) to a combatant commander’s combat power.38 
Logistics must be responsive in, and capable of, meeting military personnel, equipment, 
                                                   






mobility, medical readiness, infrastructure and sustainment requirements. To do so, it is 
important to have an effective joint theater logistics infrastructure in which command 
relationships and responsibilities are well defined to meet the conditions of the joint 
logistics support system and joint planning requirement are satisfied to achieve strategic, 
operational and tactical objectives. 
Logistics theory and principles also provide direction to the system.  The 
principles of a successful logistics system are responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, 
economy, attainability, and survivability.  Each of these principles gives direction to 
logistics planners in designing a system to optimize support for the naval expeditionary 
War-fighter. Logistics principles are both fundamental and interrelated and form a 
synergy that contributes to the successful conduct of logistics operations.39 The way in 
which these principles are applied to missions and situations will determine the concept 
of logistics support. 
Finally, the stated missions of the expeditionary customers provide direction to 
the system.  They not only tell the expeditionary forces what they must accomplish, but 
they tell the logistics planners what types of operations they must support.  For example, 
a major factor in logistics planning for the Naval Construction Forces involves obtaining 
Class IV material, the construction and building material needed for the Seabee’s 
projects.  Without those supplies, they cannot complete their primary mission. 
C.  DESIGN FACTORS 
The Organizational Systems Framework next examines the design of the system 
itself.  The system design factors make up the “black box” that transforms the system 
inputs into some results.  The system design factors are the tasks and functions it must 
perform, the technology it relies on to accomplish those tasks, the processes and sub-
systems that perform those tasks, the structure and organization of the system, and, 
finally, the people involved in the system. 
 
 
                                                   
39 US DoD, (2000), Joint Doctrine Publication 4-0, Logistics Support of Joint Operations. 
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1. Tasks and Functions 
At the highest level of the design factors are the tasks, jobs, or functions that the 
system must perform.  These are the basic functions of the system.  They identify “what” 
the system must accomplish, not “how” to go about doing it.  The “how” is defined later 
in the technology and process factors.   
The basic functions of a military logistics system are:  
Supply    Transportation 
Maintenance   Engineering 
Health services  Miscellaneous services40 
This analysis will focus on the supply and transportation functions, including 
warehousing and distribution.  Although the Seabee’s perform the engineering logistics 
function, and the fleet hospitals are providers of health services, this analysis considers 
those communities as customers, and those functions as missions of the individual 
communities.  Other miscellaneous services include mail delivery, mortuary affairs, etc.  
These functions are also beyond the scope of this research, and are limited in impact to 
the overall functioning of the expeditionary support system.   
Some other functions arise from the unique nature of military logistics and 
combat operations.  Command and control is a critical function in communicating and 
coordinating customers’ requirements with the various service providers that fulfill those 
requirements.  In the context of this analysis, command and control can help to fill the 
void between customers’ needs and the providers’ capabilities.   
Another vital function of the logistics system for support of naval expeditionary 
forces is force protection and security.  Without adequate protection, the best-designed 
logistics system can be destroyed by the enemy and rendered useless for the forces that 
depend on it.  Furthermore, when one considers that those forces may be relying on that  
                                                   
40 US DoD, (2000), Joint Doctrine Publication 4-0, Logistics Support of Joint Operations. 
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system to provide them the material they need to survive in combat; i.e., weapons and 
ammunition, this becomes one of the most basic and important functions for the success 
of the system. 
Within the Central Command area of responsibility, the functions of supply, 
transportation, and logistics command and control are met by a network of service 
providers and command and control elements at both the theater (CENTCOM) and 
service component (NAVCENT) levels.  Although Supply and Transportation are 
considered separate functions of logistics, the implementation of these functions in 
NAVCENT follows a model of a more integrated distribution network.  Therefore, 
effective analysis of these functions requires one to consider this integrated system, rather 
than the separate functions.  This NAVCENT theater supply, transportation and 
distribution network effectively merges elements of strategic and operational pre-
positioning and stock consolidation points with transportation and distribution via sea, 
air, and land multi-modal hubs and assets to successfully support naval forces at sea or on 
land. 
a. NAVCENT Supply and Distribution Points 
Bahrain is home to NAVCENT and its subordinate commands; 
COMLOGFORNAVCENT, and CTF-53.  COMLOGFORNAVCENT and CTF-53 
coordinate all logistics support for naval forces in the NAVCENT AOR.  Bahrain is the 
major logistics hub for all naval forces operating in the CENTCOM AOR, Supply 
warehousing and distribution is accomplished through a central distribution  
The Bahrain and New Zealand (BANZ) warehouse freight terminal in 
Juffair is the primary shipping and receiving location for all incoming freight to be 
distributed by CTF-53 air, surface and sea assets to end user units. For example, NSWU-
3 located in Bahrain may use the BANZ warehouse as temporary storage of non-
classified material for further transfer to end-user NSW units. 
CTF-53 operates several naval Forward Logistics Support Sites (FLSS) in 
the CENTCOM region that make up part of the tactical logistics distribution network. 
The primary locations serve as logistics nodes for the distribution of personnel, mail and 
cargo to and from end user units and include Al Fujairah and Jebel Ali in the United Arab 
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Emirates and Hurghada, Egypt. COMLOGFORNAVCENT will also establish, on an as 
required basis, temporary logistics support sites in remote areas to facilitate the 
movement of personnel, mail and cargo in support of operations. These temporary sites 
include Mombassa, Kenya; Victoria, Seychelles; Aqaba, Jordan; Djibouti; Aden, Yemen 
and Salalah, Oman. 
COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53 is the NAVCENT (N4) agent for all 
matters relating to ordnance logistics. Further, COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53 
coordinates all theater ordnance movement and provides naval ordnance logistics support 
for units operating in the CENTCOM AOR.  However, their role is mainly limited to that 
of a facilitator of ordnance movement, as the Navy does not maintain any ordnance stock 
points within the theater, instead relying on ordnance stocks embarked on Combat 
Logistics Force (CLF) ships deployed in-theater.   
This is significant to naval expeditionary units, in that there is no Navy 
ammunition supply point ashore.  Furthermore, the floating stocks in the CLF ships are 
primarily intended to support surface ship weapons systems and aviation ordnance for the 
deployed carriers.  This forces expeditionary units to rely on Marine and Army 
ammunition stock points for small arms ammunition, explosives, and munitions.  In the 
case of NSW- and EOD-unique requirements, those communities rely extensively on 
community reach-back support in CONUS to meet their needs. 
The Defense Energy Support Center (DESC)-Middle East, located within 
the FIFTH Fleet compound, is responsible for petroleum logistics in the CENTCOM 
AOR.  The mission of DESC-ME is to provide USCENTCOM and other customers 
comprehensive energy support in the most effective and economical manner possible to 
include quality assurance and surveillance, overseas bunker contract maintenance, and 
oversight of regional Defense Fuel Support Points (DFSPs).41 DESC-ME will also 
supervise, maintain and monitor stock levels and quality at the DFSPs. 
                                                   
41 Defense Energy Support Center, (n.d.), Total Energy Solutions, Fort Belvoir, VA, 
http://www.desc.dla.mil.  Retrieved on September 8, 2004. 
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Naval Regional Contracting Center (NRCC) Naples, Bahrain Detachment, 
is located at Naval Support Activity (NSA), Bahrain. NRCC Bahrain supports 
COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53 in the execution of operational logistics in the 
NAVCENT/5F AOR through acquisition and contracting functions.  NRCC Bahrain is 
the single point of contact for all contracting support for both the Atlantic and Pacific 
fleet units operating in the NAVCENT AOR. Additionally, NRCC Bahrain provides 
contracting support to all Department of Defense-Joint/Host Nation military exercises 
and the respective U.S. embassies throughout the AOR.  NRCC Bahrain/Dubai’s primary 
mission includes logistics support, expediting, replenishment, ship repair, ordnance 
handling, towing and salvage, and a host of other mission-related contracting 
requirements42. 
Although NRCC Bahrain provides contracting support for NAVCENT, 
this research found little evidence that NRCC Bahrain was supporting expeditionary 
forces in Iraq.  However, other contracting support is available in that area from the 
Marine Corps, Army, and Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Kuwait. 
b. NAVCENT Transportation Network 
The NAVCENT transportation network is also centered around the hub of 
Bahrain.  As the major logistics hub for all naval forces operating in the CENTCOM 
AOR, Bahrain can accommodate all modes of transportation; air, land and sea.   
Seaborne logistics support includes strategic sealift and operational lift 
through underway replenishment ships of the CLF.  Mina Sulman is Bahrain’s sea 
logistics hub.  From Mina Sulman, Naval Support Activity, Bahrain surface operations 
coordinates ship and submarine logistics support for naval forces in the CENTCOM 
AOR.  Other significant seaports include Jebel Ali in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and 
Al Fujairah, also in the UAE.  The port of Ash Shu’aybah, Kuwait is the Sea Port Of 
Debarkation (SPOD) for all material going into Iraq.   
 
                                                   
42 Russell, J. and Jenkins, B., (n.d.), Tip of the Spear Contracting Solutions, 
http://www.navsup.navy.mil/npi/lintest/julaug2000/russell.htm. Retrieved on November 12, 2004. 
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However, expeditionary community reliance on seaborne transportation is 
limited mainly to strategic sealift and maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) ships, as well 
as debarkation from the amphibious ships of their Expeditionary Strike Group.  These 
topics are of marginal impact on the greater issue of sustainment of deployed 
expeditionary forces.  Therefore, this research will focus more on the impact of air and 
land transportation and distribution on supporting these forces. 
NAVCENT has organized a robust air transportation and distribution 
network within the AOR.  This air network operates at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels to efficiently move cargo and personnel through the CENTCOM area.  The 
network employs a mix of U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps assets to link land-
based hubs throughout the Middle East with ships deployed in the Arabian Sea and 
Persian Gulf.  Air missions include scheduled flights into, out of, and within the AOR, 
emergent operational tasking for at-sea replenishment, and ad hoc missions for specific, 
one-time tasking. 
The strategic air network within NAVCENT is serviced mainly by the 
U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC).  The main hub for Navy support is Al 
Muharraq Airfield, the military portion of Bahrain International Airport in Manama, 
Bahrain43.  Virtually all personnel, mail and cargo coming into theater for the Navy 
moves through this hub, just a few miles from Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain 
and the main fleet base there.  Navy passengers and cargo bound for other areas within 
the theater, or for ships at sea, move on from Bahrain via theater air or sea lift.  CTF-53 
organic air assets operate on aerial routes to Forward Logistics Support Sites in support 
of forward operating expeditionary units.  
Other AMC hubs within CENTCOM are Kuwait City International 
Airport (KCIA), Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and most recently, Balad Air Base44, about 
40 miles north of Baghdad in Iraq.  Kuwait City International Airport is CENTCOM’s 
                                                   
43 Pike, J. (n.d.) Muharraq Airfield, Bahrain, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/muharraq.htm.  Retrieved on September 1, 2004. 
44 US DoD, (n.d.), CENTCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC) brief, 
https://portal.USTRANSCOM.smil.mil/cddoc.  Retrieved on September 1, 2004. 
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Aerial Port of Debarkation for Operation Iraqi Freedom and operations in the northern 
Arabian Gulf (NAG).  The Navy uses KCIA as a secondary strategic hub to support fleet 
units in the NAG, as well as naval expeditionary units on the ground in Kuwait or Iraq. 
NAVCENT can operate to and from Balad Air Base, Iraq, the home of Logistics Support 
Activity (LSA) Anaconda, in support of Navy expeditionary units, such as Naval Special 
Warfare units and Naval Mobile Construction Battalions, operating in central and 
northern Iraq. 
Although AMC or commercial carriers provide the bulk of the Navy’s 
strategic airlift, the Navy does employ some organic assets in the theater.  Navy and 
Marine Corps C-130 cargo aircraft move material, and some passengers, into and out of 
the theater.  Also, passenger-carrying C-9 and C-40 aircraft run between Bahrain and 
Navy hubs in the Mediterranean, such as Rota, Spain, and Sigonella, Sicily, or the 
Western Pacific, such as Okinawa and Guam.  However, none of these aircraft have the 

















Figure 6.   NAVCENT Theater Air Network 
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NAVCENT has a small fleet of aircraft dedicated to providing logistics 
support for Commander, Naval Forces Central Command, as well as servicing deployed 
units in the area of operations.  NAVCENT’s theater air assets operate from Al Muharraq 
Airfield at Bahrain International Airport, close to NAVCENT headquarters at NSA 
Bahrain.   
These assets include: 
• Three UC-12 aircraft, owned and operated by COMNAVCENT45, 
provide VIP, routine passenger, and light cargo service between land bases 
through the AOR. 
• Three UH-3H Sea King helicopters at Bahrain46, provide vertical on-board 
delivery (VOD) service for deployed ships only in the Arabian Gulf. 
• Four MH-53E Super Stallions at Bahrain47, provide heavy lift for the 
Navy and Marine Corps, operating over land and on larger aviation 
capable ships. 
Deployed air assets operating in the region provide a significant portion of 
NAVCENT theater air logistics support.  These assets provide both tactical support to 
their parent ships, and operational-level support, at the direction of NAVCENT, servicing 
land and sea-based destinations.  These assets include: 
• CH-46E or CH-60 VOD detachment on CLF ships in the theater. 
• C-2A Greyhound aircraft onboard the aircraft carriers 
• SH-60B/F and HH-60H helicopters on surface ships and aircraft carriers 
• Naval Air Reserve Force C-130 Hercules aircraft deployed to Bahrain 
The least robust of NAVCENT’s transportation and distribution networks 
is its ground transportation lines.  While NAVCENT has substantial ground transport 
assets to support local movement at its sea and air hubs, the Navy mainly relies on the 
Army or deployed Navy expeditionary support units for theater-level ground 
transportation.  
                                                   
45 Pike, J. (n.d.), Muharraq Airfield, Bahrain, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/muharraq.htm.  Retrieved on September 1, 2204. 
46 Pike, J. (n.d.), Helicopter Combat Support Squadron (HC-2) “Fleet Angels, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/hc-2.htm.  Retrieved on September 1, 2204. 
47 Pike, J. (n.d.), Helicopter Combat Support Squadron (HC-4) “Black Stallions 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/hc-4.htm.  Retrieved on September 1, 2204. 
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Figure 7.   NAVCENT Theater Ground Distribution Line48 
 
Along the route to Baghdad are various regional logistics sites, known as 
Logistics Support Areas (LSA).  Most of these LSA’s are former Iraqi air bases, and are 
accessible both by ground transport and by air.  At Baghdad, a secondary route branches 
off toward the bases in the western desert, while the main line continues north toward 
Mosul. 
About 40 miles north of Baghdad, LSA Anaconda, at Balad AB, is the 
Central Distribution Center (CDC); i.e., the main supply point for forces in Iraq.  This is a 
key part of both the air and land distribution networks.  It is centrally located in Iraq, 
accessible outside of the urban area around Baghdad, and on the main supply line to 
Mosul and the northern areas.  According to Gen. John Abizaid, commander of U.S.  
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Central Command in March 2004, “ . . . we are making Balad Airfield our primary hub in 
the region, and the idea of doing that is because we need to have the Baghdad 
International Airport revert to civilian control.”49  
The Navy has few assets dedicated to theater ground transportation.  Most 
navy assets are in and around the ports in Kuwait and at Umm Qasr in Iraq.  However, 
these are mainly used to facilitate the unloading of ships and the movement of goods to 
the TDC at Camp Doha.  Most onward movement to Navy units is done organically by 
those units, or is done through Army or Marine distribution.  Part of this is due to the fact 
that many of the Navy expeditionary units deployed in Iraq are supporting the Army or 
the Marine Corps directly, or are part of combined joint task forces.  For example, 
NMCBs are attached to the Marine Engineer Group and are under the operational control 
of the MEF.  Therefore, by mutual agreement of both services, they rely on the Marine 
logistics infrastructure for much of their material. 
c. Logistics Command and Control 
The logistics command and control (C2) function of a logistics system 
handles coordination and communication of requirements and support, bringing the 
customer and service provider together to meet requirements in a timely manner.  A 
major role of logistics C2 is to set priorities and deconflict requirements when needs 
outweigh the ability of the system to respond to all requirements in a timely manner.   
NAVCENT provides logistics command and control through a variety of 
task-specific groups (CTG’s) within CTF-53, as well as the Logistics Response Cell 
(LRC).  The LRC was established within the NAVCENT AOR to further the logistics 
response capability of COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53. Comprised of a mobilized 
Supply Corps, Civil Engineer Corps and senior Storekeepers reserve team, the LRC was 
launched to handle unique logistics needs, not to address the day-to-day fleet logistics 
functions already performed by CTF-53.  However, the LRC serves as an important 
liaison between NAVCENT N4 and CTF-53.50  Specifically, the LRC has been involved 
                                                   
49 Pike, J. (n.d.) Balad Air Base, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/balad.htm.  Retrieved 
on September 1, 2004. 
50 Thomas, R. (2003). NAVCENT LRC Established and Engaged. Navy Supply Corps Newsletter, 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0NQS/is_1_66/ai_97173745  Retrieved on September 9, 2004. 
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in providing solutions to emergent critical logistics matters, managing reporting 
requirements for transportation, fuel, and ordnance and administering mortuary affairs. 
The LRC has emerged as an essential component in the NAVCENT logistics system by 
providing quality logistics services to sustain and extend the operational capabilities of 
end user customers. 
Although not tailored to specifically support expeditionary units, the 
NAVCENTLRC can play a vital role as a liaison between NAVCENT’s service 
capabilities and the requirements of the remotely deployed expeditionary forces.  
However, the LRC is currently a temporary organization staffed by reservists.  Although 
it is not scheduled for deactivation in the near term, it is not a permanent part of the 
NAVCENT system.  Therefore, in its current structure, it cannot be relied on as a 
permanent solution to the expeditionary support problem. 
The Naval Expeditionary Logistics Support Force (NAVELSF) is a 
reserve component that when activated augments a Logistics Task Force such as CTF-53 
to assist with accomplishing mission objectives and provide an overseas shore-based 
supply and transportation capability. The NAVELSF is comprised of 12 Navy Cargo 
Handling Battalions, two Supply Support Battalions and a total of 3,200 reservists. 
d. Force Protection and Security 
Finally, another critical function of the logistics system is force protection 
and security.  Force protection is tasked with the defense of fixed bases, facilities, and 
infrastructure, as well individuals, homes, barracks, etc.  Additionally, force protection 
and security is critical in ensuring the continuous flow of goods and services over the 
transportation and distribution networks previously discussed.  Adequate security is 
necessary to keep these lines open and ensure goods and services are delivered in a 






Forces protection has become a major issue for NAVCENT in Bahrain, 
and has led to some controversial policy decisions.  Also, force protection and security 
has had some unforeseen consequences on other logistics support issues, such as DoD’s 
reliance on civilian contractors and local vendors for goods and services.  These issues 
will be discussed in depth later in this analysis.   
2. Technology and Processes 
The technology and processes design factors implement “how” these functions are 
to be accomplished by the system.  Technology addresses the flow of work through the 
system, the activities involved, and the interdependencies between different activities.  In 
the Organizational Systems Framework, the processes factor considers the processes and 
subsystems for financial management, human resource management, communications, 
and acquisition and contracting.  Similarly, joint logistics doctrine defines logistics 
processes as acquisition, distribution, sustainment, and disposition.51  From this point of 
view, this analysis mainly deals with distribution and sustainment processes, briefly 
considering acquisition and local procurement as a means of sustainment.  Command, 
control, communications, and information systems also are a process factor.  Force 
protection is another process when its implementation at the unit level is considered. 
References for system technology and processes include various instructions, directives, 
and standard operating procedures that specify detailed methods for accomplishing one or 
more of these processes. 
Each of the expeditionary communities has a unique concept of operations.  From 
the logistics standpoint, their operations encompass many of these logistics processes, 
including the communication of requirements through requisitioning procedures, receipt 
and local distribution of goods, etc.  Many of these processes are performed by some 
organic logistics support organization, either within the deploying unit or as a separate 
supporting element dedicated to those forces.  Logistics command and control is achieved 
through information technology systems that link the deployed unit with external 
community logistics support or common service support systems.  In the absence of 
specialized logistics information systems, common communications systems such as 
                                                   
51 US DoD, (2000), Joint Doctrine Publication 4-0, Logistics Support of Joint Operations. 
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email, the Internet, and telephones may constitute the logistics command and control 
system.  The following section analyzes these processes and systems for each 
expeditionary community. 
a. Naval Special Warfare Forces 
When deployed, NSW forces can operate unilaterally or compliment 
conventional operations in support of global requirements. The mission, operating 
environment, employment method and capabilities of NSW forces themselves are 
considerations when determining force employment. During a major theater war or 
contingency operation, NSW forces will normally consist of Naval Special Warfare Task 
Groups (NSWTG), Naval Special Warfare Task Units (NSWTU) and Naval Warfare 
Task Elements (NSWTE), which are under the operational control of either a naval 
component or joint force commander. A NSWTG will maintain command and control of 
one or more NSWTU, which is comprised of a command and control element, support 
element, and a combination of one or more SEAL or SDV platoons, and/or special boat 
detachments.52 
The type of operation, deployment sequence, unit basing, and AOR shape 
the logistics environment for SOF.53 The regional LOGSUs and NSWTUs are the 
primary support providers for NSW forces and are capable of meeting NSW requirements 
for equipment, mobility, medical, infrastructure and sustainment. During a major theater 
war, contingency operations and exercises during peacetime, a LOGSU Combat Service 
Support Detachment (CSSD) and Mobile Communications Detachment (MCD) will 
deploy to construct and provide base operating support and maintain SOF 
communications support, respectively. In many cases, NSW forces are supported by EOD 
personnel, Navy divers, Seabees, Surface Warfare Officers and associated maintenance, 
logistics and administrative personnel to enhance force capabilities and extend 
operational reach. 
                                                   
52 US DoN, Naval War College, (2003), Joint Military Operations Reference Guide, 
Forces/Capabilities Handbook. 
53 US DoD, Special Operations Command, (2003), SOF Logistics Handbook. 
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During OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), a combined NSWG 1 
LOGSU-led, task-organized force located at a forward operations base (FOB) site in 
Kuwait, primarily supported NSW forces.  The Task Force’s mission was to develop and 
execute logistics plans to deploy and support NSWG-Central/CTF-561 missions in 
support of CENTCOM and SOCCENT. CTF-561 was responsible for positioning, 
deploying, sustaining and redeploying material, equipment and personnel to the theater of 
operations. If a requirement could not be met by CTF-561, it was forwarded to NSWU-3 
located in Bahrain and/or LOGSU1 located CONUS for those emergent requirements that 
could not be satisfied within theater. It was also not unusual for forward NSW elements 
operating at the forefront to receive logistics support from the Marine Expeditionary 
Force. In closing, NSW logistics support was accomplished by adapting, developing and 
tailoring the inter-theater logistics system to meet the needs of end user customers, 
establishing FOB sites to support operations and extend operational reach, and 
determining and coordinating the right support in the right quantity in the right pace at 
the right time. 
The primary logistics support systems used by NSW forces are the 
Sustainment, Asset Visibility and Information Exchange (SSAVIE) Extranet and Micro-
SNAP. The SSAVIE Extranet is a virtual support network capable of linking NSW forces 
with logistics providers for SO-peculiar equipment, maintaining SOF asset visibility of 
inventory in use and providing an on-line technical and logistics publications library, 
including the end-item description, support structure, maintenance data and part lists.  
Micro-SNAP is the basic supply requisitioning system, which uses a web-
enabled environment to requisition and track requirements for common supplies and 
repair parts for NSW forces and their equipment. 
b. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units 
Mobile detachments are the primary operational arm of the EODMU and 
can respond as an entire detachment or are split into independent teams to respond to 
multiple EOD missions and incidents. Usually, EOD teams comprise an officer and five  
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enlisted people who are trained in a variety of skills, enabling them to operate in many 
different environments both afloat and ashore. Each detachment has the equipment, 
publications and gear necessary for the task at hand. 
Mobile detachments are assigned as group assets directly to deploying 
carrier battle groups or amphibious ready group staffs. For aircraft carrier battle groups, 
one EOD detachments is on board the carrier, with the officer-in-charge “dual hatted” 
with a task unit designator. This means that, in addition to leading the detachment, the 
officer functions as the EOD advisor to the carrier battle group commander, making 
operational assignments to all EOD task elements in the battle group. A second 
detachment is usually deployed in one of the group’s auxiliary ships. This command 
structure allows the detachments to be assigned to their battle group operational 
commanders from the beginning of the deployment work-up cycle and to be included in 
all phases of training, planning, exercises and operations. EOD support to an amphibious 
group is similar to that provided to a carrier battle group, with the additional job of 
working with maneuver forces ashore. 
EOD shore-based detachments are located at shore activities that need 
continuous EOD support, including general ordnance handling and disposal, live-fire 
training, range clearance and underwater ordnance testing. Shore-based detachments may 
be deployed to respond to military and civilian incidents, and are on-call to provide 
“VIP” protection support for the Secret Service and State Department. 
In a logistics perspective, EOD detachments don’t include organic 
logistics capabilities within the operating unit. Both mobile detachments and ashore 
detachments are collocated with a logistics command that provides basic logistics 
support.  This support includes everything except for EOD specific items such as 
ordnance locators. Normally, detachments reach back to Continental US to get 
community specific equipment. 
c. Naval Construction Force 
The basic deployable unit for the NCF is the Naval Mobile Construction 
Battalion (NMCB).  The NMCB can deploy as an integral unit of their deployed NCR, or 
as an independently deployed battalion.  In either situation, the NMCB will normally 
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deploy to either one of four existing permanent main body sites, or will deploy in 
conjunction with the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).  Once deployed, the battalion 
provides specialized, task-organized detachments to address specific support 
requirements at remote locations.  Detachments vary in size from less than ten Sailors to 
up to half of the battalion.  The make up and duration of time of the detachments is task-
dependant based on the needs of the supported customer at the detachment site.  Some 
detachment sites are pre-established, with existing infrastructure in place for repeated 
detachments.  Other detachments are established to meet emergent requirements during 
the deployment, or are based upon the deployment of forces in the supported MEF. 
The primary customer of the deployed NMCB is the Marine Air-Ground 
Task Force (MAGTF) or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).  When deployed with a 
MAGTF or MEF, the NMCB, or other NCF unit, comes under the operational control 
(OPCON) of the Marine commander.  If deployed as a component of their regiment, the 
NMCB commander operates under the immediate command of an NCR Command 
Element (CE), which reports directly to the MEF.  In exercising OPCON over the 
attached NCF unit, the Marine commander has full authority to employ the NCF unit as 
needed to accomplish its missions.  From the logistics standpoint, the Marine Corps’ 
operational control includes responsibility for re-supply and sustainment of the NCF unit, 
as stated in NWP 4-04.1. 
The mission of the NMCB is to provide responsive military construction 
support to Navy, Marine Corps, and other forces in military operations; to construct and 
maintain base facilities; to repair battle-damaged facilities, and to conduct limited 
defensive operations as required by the circumstances of the deployment.54 
Commanded by a Civil Engineer Corps Commander, the NMCB consists 
of 24 officers and up to 745 enlisted Sailors (with Reserve augmentation).  The NMCB 
consists of a headquarters company, one equipment/horizontal construction company, 
one camp maintenance/utilities company, two to three vertical construction companies, 
and a Reserve augment.   
                                                   
54 US DoD, (1997). Naval Warfare Publication 4-04.1 / Marine Corps Warfare Publication 4-11.5, 
SEABEE Operations in the MAGTF. 
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The NMCB is outfitted with a Table of Allowance (TOA) of equipment, 
weapons, communications systems, and supplies.  The TOA includes approximately 300 
pieces of CESE and common vehicles such as HMMWV’s (i.e., “Hummvee’s”) and 
MTVR’s.  It also includes personal and crew-served weapons and all the messing and 
berthing equipment needed to support the battalion. 
Within the NMCB, the S-4 department is responsible for supply and 
logistics support for the battalion, including its remote detachments.  The battalion S-4 
department consists of three officers and approximately 20 enlisted Sailors.  The battalion 
Supply Officer (S-4) is a Supply Corps Lieutenant Commander.  He is assisted by a 
Supply Corps junior officer as Assistant Supply Officer and a Civil Engineer Corps 
junior officer as the Material Liaison Officer (MLO).  The MLO is responsible for 
procuring all Class IV material (construction and barrier material) needed to complete the 
unit’s construction projects.  Two Chief Storekeepers (SKC) provide enlisted leadership, 
and one SEABEE Chief Petty Officer assists the MLO with Class IV requirements.  One 
E-4 to E-6 SK is assigned to each detachment to handle material requirements at the 
remote site. 
Automation of logistics and supply support is achieved through several 
parallel systems within the S-4 department.  The Project Material Planning and Tracking 
(PMPT) program is a new program used for ordering and tracking Class IV material; 
building and barrier material needed for the battalion’s construction projects.  Micro-
SNAP is the basic supply requisitioning system, which uses a web-enabled environment 
to order and track requisitions for common supplies and repair parts for TOA equipment.  
When deployed, each of these systems are operated at the main body deployment site.  
Information is sent back from remote detachments and entered into the appropriate 
system at the main body site.  Because Micro-SNAP is a web-enabled application, it can 
be accessed at remote detachments with Internet connectivity.  However, unless specific 
action is taken to direct delivery to the detachment site, material will still be delivered to 
the main body site and forwarded on to the detachment. 
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The battalion’s Table of Allowance includes the equipment authorized for 
the battalion, as well as an embedded Consolidated Allowance List (COSAL) for spare 
parts to maintain that equipment.  Each battalion’s TOA is tailored for the specific 
deployment missions, location, and expected duration.  The embedded COSAL in the 
TOA is tailored to support only the equipment actually provided.   
The NMCB maintains a Table of Allowance (TOA) capable of sustaining 
construction operations under contingency or combat conditions for 60 days without re-
supply.  Class I material is limited to 5 days, Class III is to 3 days, and Class V to 15 
days. Class IV is limited to only those materials required to construct the NMCB’s base 
camp.  Re-supply past these timeframes is the responsibility of the supported MAGTF’s 
G-4.55 Therefore, the standard doctrine for supporting a NMCB deployed with the MEF 
or MAGTF is for the Marine Corps to provide all needed supply support, including food, 
fuel, and ammunition, and even common parts when those parts are available through the 
Marine Corps supply system. 
Furthermore, procurement of Class IV materials for tasked projects is 
coordinated with the supported MEF G-4.56  Since the MEF is a supported “customer” of 
the NMCB for construction projects, the MEF must procure and pay for all Class IV 
building materials needed to complete its projects.  This same policy applies to other 
supported NMCB “customers,” such as Fleet Hospitals or Naval Special Warfare units.  
If the SEABEE’s are providing services to those units, they will rely on logistics support, 
including funding, from the “customer” unit to obtain required materials. 
d. Fleet Hospitals 
During a deployment to the Fifth Fleet AOR, reserve and active units 
follow the dual command structure, depicted in Figure 8, working for the Marine and 
Navy component commanders simultaneously. 
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Figure 8.   Deployed Fleet Hospital Unit Organizational Chart 
 
The Marine Corps component commander (MARCENT) directs the 
medical facilities’ movement and location, while the Navy component commander 
(NAVCENT) directs the logistical arrival of personnel and equipment while also 
assuming all administrative functions while the unit is in-theater. 
Historically, the size of deployed medical facilities have centered on the 
ability to provide medical care on a large, cold war era, scale. However, lessons learned 
from operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM illustrated a change in 
warfare and mission requirements.  Deployable medical systems (DEPMEDS) now must 
be capable of supporting a myriad of mission scenarios, and, more importantly, 
incorporate the additional characteristics of modularity, ease of transport, and rapid 
deploy ability.  A new, modular/scalable capability, which could provide the theater 
commander with medical facility conducive with the requirements required has 
transformed the deployable Fleet Hospital organization. These new “Emergency Medical 
Facilities or Units” could be as small or as large as needed, with the smallest modular 
component deployed to date being a 10-bed hospital.57 
Fleet Hospital deployments are at the request of the theater commander. 
Once requested, it is the responsibility of the Fleet Hospital Support Officer (FHSO) to 
design, and outfit the medical facility required.  Pre-positioned medical equipment is 
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located in warehouse facilities or military sealift ships.  These facilities are located 
throughout the world, with warehouses located in Korea, Japan, and Norway (2 
complexes built into mountain), and are available for rapid deployment.  Initial outfitting 
of the facility includes required housing and galley facilities, construction equipment, and 
enough medical supplies to support the facility for the first 30 days of operations.58  The 
BUMED/CNO931/PML-500 dispatches a Fleet Hospital Assistance Team (FHAT), 
which is comprised of a Civil Engineer Corps Officer, Medical Service Corps Officer, 
corpsman and various Construction personnel to coordinate the shipment of equipment 
and supplies, conduct advance scouting of the proposed construction site, and liaise with 
area commanders in support of the Fleet Hospital unit.  Once the equipment is on station, 
medical facilities are rapidly built. A 250 bed medical facility constructed in Rota, Spain 
was operational within one week’s time.  After the first thirty days of operation, the 
facilities’ supply department assumes the responsibility of ordering supplies and 
coordination of shipment.  The size of this department is dependent on the size of the 
medical facility; however, the manpower is quite substantial. For the Rota, Spain facility, 
the supply department consisted of 60 personnel, which included storekeepers, culinary 
specialists, ship servicemen, and bio-med specialists.  Two construction battalion units 
handle the operation and maintenance of the facility and are comprised of fifty to eighty 
SEABEES. These personnel work closely with the supply personnel in the logistical 
aspects of the medical facility. 
Whenever two or more services are operating within the Combatant 
Command’s AOR, a single service may be designated as the region’s Single Integrated 
Medical Logistics Manager (SIMLM).59  The SIMLM provides materials management, 
medical equipment maintenance and repair, blood management, and optical fabrication 
for all joint forces within the theater of operations, except U.S. Navy gray hull ships.60  In 
the CENTCOM AOR, the U.S. Army is the designated executive agent for SIMLM.  
Medical facilities, such as Fleet Hospital units, submit their logistical requirements to the 
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SIMLM using the Theater Army Medical Management Information System (TAMMIS).  
The SIMLM provides standard medical supplies. Fleet Hospital units that require 
supplies not provided by the SIMLM must procure them through NAVCENT or other 
agent pre-designated by the theater commander. 
e. Force Protection 
Force protection has had an even greater and more direct impact on those 
expeditionary forces operating in Iraq.  The most direct impact has been on convoy and 
distribution line security.  Attacks on convoys have disrupted the flow of material in the 
theater and caused the expeditionary forces to dedicate organic manpower to security 
functions at the expense of their primary mission.  This creates additional inefficiencies 
that are not experienced during peacetime operations. 
Another impact of force protection and security has been on civilian 
contractors and local vendors.  Traditional contracting relationships with vendors have 
required them to deliver goods and services on location to the forces being supported.  
For example, a Seabee battalion may contract with a vendor to provide Class IV material.  
That contract typically requires delivery on site in a timely manner.  Failure to do so 
results in contractual default.   
However, the security situation in Iraq has made this an unrealistic 
expectation in some cases.  Lessons learned from Naval Construction Force units 
identified the fact that many local vendors were being targeted for intimidation, 
kidnapping, or assassination due to the fact that they were providing support for U.S. 
forces.  Shipments were hijacked along the supply lines, with the material stolen or 
destroyed and the vendors or drivers kidnapped or killed.  In some cases, vendors were 
identified as they left U.S. bases and were then kidnapped.  The intent was not only to 
disrupt the flow of material to U.S. forces, but also to intimidate the vendors and 
discourage them from seeking additional contracts.  Ultimately, the insurgency sees this 
as a means to eliminate all local material support for U.S. forces. 
 
 50
The local solution implemented by the Seabee’s was to set up a series of 
logistics cells closer to the sources of supply, and away from their operating bases.  Also, 
they established a drop off point for Class IV material at Baghdad International Airport.  
Vendors would drop off supplies there in a relatively secure environment.  Seabee’s 
would rely on their own organic transportation assets to move the material forward 
through the more dangerous supply lines outside of Baghdad to the forward bases.  While 
this kept the vendors safe and ensured the flow of material, it comes at an expense in 
terms of manpower and equipment assets for the Seabee’s and Marines they support. 
3. The Human Factor 
The human factor in the logistics system encompasses the people who execute the 
intra-theater logistics support to naval expeditionary forces.  From the systems model 
perspective, this factor comprises the people’s motives, expectations and mindsets as 
logistics personnel and their knowledge, skills and abilities to execute their mission. 
Accordingly, this section focuses on the logistics system’s human capabilities and their 
ability to execute the logistics functions. 
The logistics system consists of service providers and war-fighting customers. 
Thousands of people work hard to provide the best logistics support possible given the 
existing resources and capabilities.  A logistics planner operates on the strategic, 
operational, and/or tactical level, based in CONUS or deployed into theater, afloat or 
ashore, and faces highly dynamic demand and supply chain variables. In spite of its 
complex and reactive nature, the structures and people in the logistics system strive to be 
proactive through pre-positioning of material and extensive contingency planning. 
Support of naval expeditionary forces places additional challenges into the 
equation. Their dynamic and fluid organization during deployment, coupled with mission 
categories and concealed footprint, makes logistics support challenging. However, 
organic capabilities combined with training, knowledge and expertise makes it possible.  
a. Organic Capabilities 
This research identifies that three out of four of the expeditionary forces 
relevant to this report deploy with significant organic logistics capabilities. That is, NSW 
units, NCF units, and Fleet Hospitals deploy with logisticians familiar with the logistics 
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system.  On the contrary, the EOD units deploy with personnel that have logistics 
responsibilities as a collateral function. The nature of their deployment organization, 
normally co-located with a supporting command, explains some of this finding. However, 
the need for dedicated, organic logisticians in these units should be subject for further 
investigation. 
The importance of organic logistics capabilities in a human factor 
perspective is reflected through high motivation, focus and mind set. When a logistics 
element is part of the deployed unit, the motivation and commitment to provide the right 
support, in the right quantity at the right place and on the right time seems to be very 
high. The LOGSU, which serves the NSW forces, is as an example on the matter. Due to 
the nature of these units’ operations, the logistics support element has established a solid 
infrastructure in-theater, with responsive contacts in CONUS. Focusing on support of 
these units, the logistics personnel adopt the attitudes and identity associated with NSW 
operations. The mind set is to provide the support no matter what it takes, either using the 
logistics pipeline or commercial providers. This professionalism and cultural features 
among logisticians is found in the NCF units and the Fleet Hospitals as well. In the EOD 
community, technicians assigned to provide logistics support seem to be very dedicated 
and motivated, but since this is only a collateral function, the ability to utilize the existing 
logistics infrastructure is probably reduced. This research does not include a specific 
assessment of the EOD units’ need for organic logistics capabilities. Rather, it aims to 
raise awareness regarding the current practices and target areas for improvement. 
Accordingly, the report questions whether these units would be better off with a more 
robust logistics capability, although they normally are collocated with a supporting 
command. 
b. Training, Knowledge and Expertise 
In addition to the organic capabilities, relevant training, knowledge and 
expertise are critical to support of the naval expeditionary forces. Established logistics 
doctrine and procedures are in place to execute effective command and control of the 
logistics functions. For logistics personnel, this means that the organizations, roles and 
relationships among the providers on the Combatant Commander level, the Service 
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Component level and the unit level are defined61. Additionally, doctrine and procedures 
provides a common language between the interdependent actors in the system. Ideally, 
this ensures that communication and support processes are efficient, and align the design 
factors in the logistics system. This research suggests that these benefits partly exist. 
The logistics personnel are trained and prepared to execute effective and 
efficient support.  The typical logistician is educated, experienced, and trained in relevant 
environments.  Accordingly, their ability to execute the logistics functions is in place. 
The S-4 department within a NMCB, as an example, seems to be sufficiently staffed and 
have access to adequate supply systems such as the PMPT and Micro-Snap. Provided 
with relevant training and experience, doctrine, sufficient staffing and support systems, 
this department is a viable logistics resource. NSW units and Fleet Hospitals seem to hold 
equivalent capabilities, indicating that the expertise is in place for adequate support of the 
expeditionary forces. The EOD units, with its fragmented logistics capabilities, have 
access to logistics support in a more indirect nature. 
4. Organization and Structure 
Analysis of the system’s structure involves an understanding of the hierarchy of 
leadership within the organization, the breakdown and distribution of work, tasks, and 
functions, and the roles and responsibilities of the key groups and individuals in the 
organization.  Integration of functions and responsibilities is also a key to understanding 
the structure, and whether it contributes to or hinders the success of the organization. 
In considering the NAVCENT logistics system, one must first understand the 
hierarchy of forces within NAVCENT, and NAVCENT’s role as a service component 
commander under the theater combatant commander, CENTCOM.  Joint doctrine 
discusses in detail the division of responsibility between the combatant commander and 
the service component commander regarding logistics support.  Since combatant 
commanders exercise command authority over assigned forces within their geographic 
AOR, they are overall responsible for joint theater logistics and maintain directive 
authority for logistics. This directive authority ensures the effective execution of 
approved operation plans, the effectiveness and economy of the operation, and the 
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prevention or elimination of unnecessary facility duplication and overlapping functions.62  
Combatant commanders are responsible for reviewing each Service component 
commanders’ specific requirements and establishing priorities in support of strategic 
objectives. Combatant commanders are also responsible for managing resource allocation 
and supply support among the Service components. Further, the combatant commander is 
responsible for a distribution network, maintenance, salvage, construction facilities 
engineering, base development, coordinating health services, and other services.63  
The naval component commander directly supporting CENTCOM executes 
NAVCENT operational logistics. COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53 working directly 
for NAVCENT has the responsibility to provide logistics support to all naval forces 
operating within the AOR. At this point, there is no distinction between whether these 
naval forces are operating at-sea or ashore. However, NAVCENT’s role as the Navy 
component within the CENTCOM AOR has the responsibility for exercising command 
and control over all naval operations, including designation as the Joint Force Maritime 
Component Commander (JFMCC) during conflict implies that there is more dedicated 
support to naval forces at-sea. Therefore, one can conclude that the NAVCENT logistics 
system was developed for and intended to support naval forces at-sea with little planning 
and supporting consideration given to naval expeditionary forces operating ashore due to 
its primary C2 mission of maritime operations. COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53 
serving as the logistics supporting command for NAVCENT provides the oversight of 
and executes the NAVCENT logistics system. Its supporting organizations are structured 
to provide operational logistics support for maritime forces. As a result, naval 
expeditionary forces ashore have had to operate in a fragmented, inefficient logistics 
system using ad hoc procedures in an effort to support operations.   
D.  RESULTS AND OUTPUTS 
Finally, the Organizational Systems Framework examines the results of the 
system.  System results should be the driving force behind any analysis of a system.  If 
the system results are satisfactory, then few changes should be necessary.  More 
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importantly, any changes to the inputs or design of a system should directly reflect 
desired improvements in system results.  The OSF considers system results in three 
categories.  Cultural outputs reflect the impact the system has on people’s behaviors, 
values, and relationships.  System outputs refer to the tangible products of a system and 
the metrics for measuring that.  The outcomes of the system are the consequences 
produced by those outputs.  During this research, much of the data used to define these 
results came from official lessons learned, after-action reports, and personal interviews 
with key personnel in the logistics system. 
1. Organizational Culture 
The implementation of the previously-discussed design factors have led to several 
key cultural outcomes which adversely impact the effectiveness of the over-all logistics 
system.  These cultural outcomes are not mutually exclusive, and often inter-related.  
Each cultural outcome contributes in some way to the perpetuation of one or more other 
outcome, thus making it very difficult to change these mindsets. 
a. Conflicting Motivations and Mindsets 
The first cultural indicator is a difference in perspectives and mindsets 
between the logistics customers and their service providers.  The root of this is 
motivation and accountability.  The customers are war-fighters driven by their individual 
community missions.  Logistics is an enabler to accomplish that mission.  The 
customer/war-fighter is going to do whatever is possible to accomplish that mission.  If 
the logistics system cannot get them what they need, or even worse, if it becomes an 
impediment to accomplishing the mission, the customer/war-fighter will find a way 
around the system to get what they need. 
The logistics providers’ mission is to provide that needed support.  
However, they can be more motivated by following an established process, rather than 
the ultimate outcome of that process.  In some cases, that outcome, i.e., the customer 





b. Service Parochialism 
This leads to the next outcome; service parochialism.  Service 
parochialism is the natural bias one has toward one’s own organization over peer 
organizations; mainly the Navy over other services, or one’s own sub-community over 
other communities within the Navy.    When combined with the Navy’s cultural value for 
problem solving, this parochialism can create a tendency to seek solutions for community 
problems or needs from within, when the better solution may be to look outside of the 
immediate organization for a more efficient solution. 
Another aspect of service parochialism involves an organization’s 
tendency to focus on their “core competencies” first.  In the case of operational logistics, 
the Navy’s, and NAVCENT’s, core logistics competency is at-sea logistics.  Clearly, the 
vast majority of NAVCENT’s material requirements are for ships at-sea in the Persian 
Gulf and Northern Arabian Sea.  As the Combined Forces Maritime Component 
Commander, NAVCENT has responsibility for coordinating support for all forces at sea 
in the OAR, regardless of service or nation.  However, as the Navy service component 
commander, they also have responsibility for providing logistics support for U.S. Navy 
forces in theater, regardless of whether they are at sea or ashore.  Therefore, although the 
focus on at-sea logistics is understandable and in-line with the Navy’s logistics core 
competencies, NAVCENT should play a more active role in providing support to those 
Navy forces deployed ashore, as well.  This could be accomplished through increased 
joint planning and coordination in theater. 
c. Force Protection and Shifting Organizational Values 
Finally, force protection and security issues have created some additional 
cultural influences that impact the logistics system in NAVCENT and CENTCOM 
specifically.  The main issue is that the threat of terrorism in the region is creating a shift 
in values and priorities for leaders of the organization.  Their values have shifted toward 
protection of forces, first and foremost, forcing a reduction in forces to only those forces 
absolutely essential to completing the mission at hand.  This is driving policy decisions  
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that support lower force levels at the expense of quantity and quality of logistics services 
provided. There is a trade-off between force protection and the ability to provide the 
highest levels of logistics support.    
2. Outputs and Outcomes 
The cultural mindsets discussed previously lead to specific metrics to measure the 
performance of the logistics support system.  Units and individuals are held accountable 
for these performance metrics on evaluations and inspections.  In the case of logistics 
customers/war-fighters, these metrics are mission-related.  Waiting for the supply system 
to catch up to a critical requirement may adversely impact those metrics, if not actual 
mission accomplishment.  For example, a construction battalion CO may be evaluated on 
his units’ output of construction projects, versus that of similar battalions.  The closest he 
may come to being evaluated on logistics may be the efficiency of his OPTAR 
obligations in relation to projects completed.  Similarly, a Fleet Hospital CO would be 
evaluated on patient throughput and quality of care, while a SEAL may be evaluated on 
successful missions and targets destroyed.  
In the case of logistics providers, their metrics focus more on the management of 
logistics resources rather than the mission outcomes those resources enable.  These 
metrics can create a disincentive to accurately depict requirements if those requirements 
paint a negative image of the logistics process or management.  For example, the Supply 
Officer in charge of the supply warehouse that stocks material in support of that Seabee 
Battalion, Fleet Hospital, or SEAL unit would be evaluated on the accuracy of stock 
records and their efficiency at filling documented requirements.   
E.  FEEDBACK AND INITIATIVES 
The final aspect of the Organizational Systems Framework is the feedback loop.  
This is a critical link between the resulting outcomes of the system and the inputs and 
design factors that produced those outcomes.  It is the mechanism to continuously 
evaluate and adapt the system to get the intended results.  For the naval expeditionary 
logistics support system, the feedback loop involves various strategic and operational 
initiatives and changes currently going on that will change the way naval expeditionary 
forces are supported.  The strategic initiatives change inputs to the system through-based 
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changes in focus for DoD or the Navy.  Operational initiatives change elements of the 
design factors.  They are more focused changes to processes or systems that affect the 
way logistics support is provided. 
Based on lessons learned form the Global War on Terrorism and Operations 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, DoD is moving aggressively to transform existing 
logistics processes, infrastructure, and systems through Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) changes in order to create 
the capability to project and sustain forces rapidly with reduced footprint and to support 
distributed, adaptive operations.64  This section presents DoD’s strategic and operational 
initiatives, which are meant to maximize employment of expeditionary forces operating 
in a joint environment.   
Although of these initiatives are currently being implemented within DoD, the 
Navy, or the expeditionary communities, their impact on the logistics system has not 
been felt to a great degree at the time of this research.  Therefore, at this point, these 
initiatives are considered feedback to the system direction or design blocks. However, in 
the future they will become part of those elements and influence future implementation 
and results of this system. 
1. Strategic Initiatives 
Initiatives on a strategic level affect the military logistics system on a broader 
scope than operational initiatives, which are implemented to affect the system more 
directly.  Strategic initiatives promote culture changes within the system with the 
intention of removing inefficiencies, which are a result of misguided policies or 
traditions.  The following strategic initiatives will be analyzed with regards to their 
effects on naval expeditionary force logistics:  Focused Logistics, SEABasing, and 
Distribution Process Owner Designation. 
a. Focused Logistics - Joint Vision 2020 
Joint Vision (JV) 2020, the follow-on vision to JV 2010, encompasses 
four operational concepts: Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional 
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Protection, and Focused Logistics.65  JV 2020 also covers the enabling concepts of 
Information Superiority and Technological Innovation. Each will contribute to achieving 
full spectrum dominance for the 2020 force.66 The interrelation of Focused Logistics to 
the other operational concepts of JV 2020 is important. While the contributions of 
logistics has been widely recognized throughout US history, this is the first time logistics 
has been formally designated a full partner in the joint war-fighting process. 
Focused Logistics is the strategic concept that defines broad joint logistics 
capabilities that are necessary to deploy, employ, sustain, and re-deploy forces across the 
full spectrum of operations.  The objective of focused logistics is to improve support to 
the war-fighter, and as such, is critical to the future support of naval expeditionary forces, 
which operate in a joint environment and require broader logistical support.  Logistics 
forces have the responsibility to sustain combat at all levels, strategic, operational, and 
tactical providing the resources necessary for US forces to achieve and maintain battle-
space dominance.67  Focused logistics draws from the core competencies of each of the 
services and defense agencies.  This joint logistic community effort centers on identifying 
and evaluating desired operational capabilities for the 2020 force. These logistics 
capabilities, if proven and implemented, will be translated into a future joint operating 
capability. 
The challenge of focused logistics represents the grouping of similar 
logistics functions and systems to define desired operational capabilities for the 2020 
force.  The ones that will directly affect naval expeditionary forces are:  Joint 
Deployment and Rapid Distribution, Information Fusion, Multinational Logistics, Agile 
Infrastructure, and Joint Theater Logistics Management.  Defining, developing, 
understanding, validating and implementing these tenets becomes the essence of future 
joint logistic operations.68 
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Joint Deployment and Rapid Distribution is the process of moving multi-
service forces to an operational area coupled with accelerated delivery of logistic 
resources through improved transportation and information networks. These integrated 
deployment, distribution, and informational networks will provide the naval 
expeditionary forces with improved visibility and accessibility of assets from source of 
supply to point of need.69  As a result, these forces will obtain critical supplies more 
rapidly reducing unit downtime due to logistical inefficiencies. 
Information Fusion is the primary platform and key enabler for achieving 
major improvements in logistic support.  This concept will provide timely and accurate 
access and integration of logistic data across units and combat support agencies.  
Information technology will improve logistic support to the naval expeditionary forces by 
providing reliable and critical information regarding valuable resources that are either in 
process, in transit, or in storage.70 
Multinational Logistics establishes mutual logistics support relationships 
between the United States and its allies or coalition partners.  Multinational and third 
party logistics play an important role in most military engagements.  It is essential that 
planners capitalize on the resources, processes, and capabilities of multinational and 
contractor-supported operations if these key elements are to be successfully integrated 
into the overall joint logistic infrastructure and organization.71  With increase emphasis 
on multinational operations, naval expeditionary forces require more logistical 
coordination with foreign militaries in the event that the forces are in a geographical 
location where the host nation is providing all the logistical support. 
Agile Infrastructure will effectively size the logistic footprint through 
intelligent reductions in logistic forces, facilities, equipment, and supplies. These 
reductions will be accomplished through changes to joint logistic doctrines, policies, 
structures and processes for inventory management, engineering, services, maintenance, 
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and infrastructure.72  This is a critical component to the naval expeditionary force as it 
directly affects how they will be supported while deployed.  With a decreased footprint, 
obtaining increased technological logistic support will be essential to make up for the 
decrease in size of logistical support. 
Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM) integrates the logistic 
capabilities of the forces in-theater to fulfill the common user and cross service support 
mission.  When applied to the other challenges and desired operational capabilities of 
focused logistics, JTLM facilities support to the war-fighter while achieving economies 
and reducing the logistics footprint.  JTLM optimizes resources by synchronizing all 
logistic support efforts in-theater.  The objective is to provide rapid, timely delivery of 
forces, material, and sustainment to the Theater Commander. JTLM provides to the 
Theater Commander the ability to synchronize, prioritize, direct, integrate, and coordinate 
common user and cross service logistic functions necessary to accomplish the joint 
theater mission.73  This policy empowers the Theater Commander to delegate support to 
critical operations, which will directly affect naval expeditionary forces as they conduct 
their high profile missions. 
b. SEABasing – SEAPower 21 
SEAPower 21 encompasses a new vision for the Navy and how it will 
operate to take advantage of the unique characteristics operation from the sea provides. 
The vision consists of three aspects SEAShield, SEABasing and SEAStrike, which are all 
enabled by ForceNet a system designed to integrate warriors, sensors, networks, 
platforms and weapons into one netted force.  As part of integrating Sea Power 21 into 
the naval logistics force, an Expeditionary Support Policy Council (ESPC) was created. 
The purpose of the ESPC was to identify and develop logistics business rules, processes, 
procedures, and policies, which enhance naval and joint expeditionary operations to meet 
the objectives of Sea Power 21. Since SEABasing is the logistic aspect of Sea Power 21, 
its vision has been widely influenced by the findings of the ESPC. 
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SEABasing is the core of SEAPower 21. It is about placing at sea 
capabilities critical to joint and coalition operational success: offensive and defensive 
firepower, maneuver, forces, command and control, and logistics. This minimizes the 
need to build up forces and supplies ashore, reducing their vulnerability and enhancing 
their operational mobility. It will be increasingly central to joint military planning 
because the traditional advantages enjoyed by afloat forces, such as independence, 
mobility, and security, are becoming ever more important to military affairs, while 
traditional limitations of SEABasing forces, including operational reach and connectivity, 
have been largely overcome by technologies and concept of operations. Because of these 
changes, the value of SEABasing in an increasingly interdependent world will continue 
to rise, providing operational freedom for joint and coalition forces, compressing 
deployment timelines, strengthening deterrence, and providing dominant and decisive 
combat power from the sea.74  SEABasing accelerates expeditionary deployment and 
employment timelines by pre-positioning vital equipment and supplies in-theater, 
preparing the United States to take swift and decisive action during crises. Strategic 
sealift will be central to this effort. Moreover, building pre-positioned ships, with at sea 
accessible cargo, is vital to future logistical support operations.  Joint operational 
flexibility will be greatly enhanced by employing pre-positioned shipping that does not 
have to enter port to offload.75 
c. USTRANSCOM – Distribution Process Owner 
The Secretary of Defense designated the Commander, USTRANSCOM, 
as the DoD’s Distribution Process Owner (DPO).  As such, it is charged with improving 
the overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution-related activities during peace 
and war.  In addition, the DPO serves as the single entity to direct and supervise 
execution of the strategic distribution system.  Prior to this designation, end-to-end 
distribution support to the war-fighter was marked by a multitude of process and 
information technology challenges.  Essentially, DoD distribution was a series of stove- 
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75 Naval Institute Proceedings (OCT, 2002):  Sea Power 21, Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities. 
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piped processes and information systems managed by many discrete owners. Such 
segmentation caused inefficiencies and drove DPO designation to promote enterprise 
solutions.76 
As a department, the DPO will bring collective talents and ongoing 
initiatives together to forecast requirements, synchronize the movement of cargo and 
personnel from a source of supply to a designated customer, and expeditiously respond to 
war-fighter requirements.  The intention is to provide a “factory to foxhole” distribution 
system, linking the entire global DoD supply chain.  The DPO’s focus area extends from 
a point of sale to the first retail activity in-theater, as designated by the theater 
commander.  In addition, a plan to designate one IT backbone is in place, establishing 
business rules to link sustainment and distribution systems into a data warehouse, where 
supply requisitions and movement requirements are visible to distribution system 
customers.77 
d. Strategic Initiatives Sub Conclusion 
The implementation of these initiatives will greatly enhance the execution 
of logistical support to the naval expeditionary forces as it incorporates a leaner supply 
chain with reduced “stove piping”.  If properly applied, these initiatives will update 
critical procedures and doctrine improving the culture of support throughout the naval 
logistics system. 
2. Operational and Tactical Initiatives 
Unlike strategic initiatives, which are broad in nature, operational/tactical 
Initiatives provide are designed to provide a more direct impact on the logistics chain.  
These initiatives, once implemented, will have a profound affect on the operation of the 
logistics system and will directly affect the support the naval expeditionary forces 
receive.  The following Operational/Tactical initiatives will be analyzed with regards to 
their affect on naval expeditionary logistics: CDDOC, RFID/TAV/ITV, DLA Central, 
and the Deployable LSC concept. 
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Given on March 17, 2004. 
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a. CDDOC 
CENTCOM, in partnership with the DPO (USTRANSCOM), DLA, and 
other national providers, has taken steps to transform the deployment and distribution 
process and eliminate the seams between strategic and operational logistics.  One of its 
initial steps was the implementation of a DPO initiative designed to improve end-to-end 
distribution within the DoD.  The result was the creation of a CENTCOM Deployment 
and Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC).78  Its mission is to link strategic 
deployment and distribution processes to operational and tactical functions to support the 
war-fighter.  Combining the expertise of DLA, USTRANSCOM, the military services 
and other materiel distribution stakeholders, the CDDOC is rethinking and rewriting how 
materiel will be shipped, received, and tracked in theaters of operations.  With a clearer 
view of all of the distribution occurring in an operation, commanders at the most senior 
levels will be better able to prioritize their needs and make decisions in the early stages of 
the distribution process.  The intent is to relieve the transportation and distribution system 
by better synchronizing movements and potentially preventing duplicate requisitioning 
actions for items that were previously delayed in transit.79  Working under the tactical 
command of the CNETCOM Director of Logistics, CDDOC is improving CENTCOM’s 
ability to locate and provide data on shipment quantity, composition and delivery times to 
expedite the distribution of high priority commodities to the military services.80  
CENTCOM will be able to prioritize and plan for the constantly changing requirements 
of the military forces while improving the speed, cost effectiveness and efficiency of 
equipment and supplies delivered. 
b. RFID/TAV/ITV 
A tracking technology called radio frequency identification (RFI) that can 
spot and track the smallest of containers and what is inside them is set to revolutionize 
                                                   
78 US DoD, (FEB, 2004), USCENTCOM news release, Release number 04-02-17. 
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the way supplies are delivered.81  A precise inventory can be maintained of every air 
dropped container with ground control being able to track its every movement from 
thousand of miles away. 
During Operation Desert Storm, over 40,000 containers of supplies and 
materiel were shipped to the CENTCOM AOR.  As a result of poor accounting and 
logistical tracking, nearly half of the containers required manual inspection in order to 
ascertain their contents.  This time intensive procedure ultimately led to unfulfilled 
supply requests, which required reordering degrading the readiness and effectiveness of 
the requesting units.  Because of these and other supply inefficiencies experienced during 
the first Gulf War, the DoD created the Logistics Automatic Identification Technology 
(AIT) Office in 1997.82  The office was instrumental the in the creation of a new 
technology called radio frequency identification (RFID) which has facilitated the task of 
tracking critical cargo shipments.  The DoD is using RFID in conjunction with the Global 
Positioning System to track shipments worldwide.  RFID tags affixed to individual items 
or to cargo containers can be tracked in near real time while in transit.  Military personnel 
can seamlessly query the RFID tags and locate the items promptly decreasing “lost in 
shipment” surveys dramatically. 
c. DLA – Central 
DLA-Central (DLA-C) was established in order for DLA to have a 
permanent presence in the CENTCOM region.  In coordination with CENTCOM at its 
rear headquarters in Tampa, Fla., DLA-C creates one focal point for the DLA director 
and combatant commander for Southwest Asia.  Currently three DLA customer service 
representatives work inside and outside the theater of operations to create a viable bridge 
towards better advisement and communication between DLA field activities and its 
military customers.  The new organization does not have command over DLA's 
distribution centers; it instead provides the field activities with one point of contact for all 
supply requisitions in the Middle East.  Similar to the already established DLA-Europe, 
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supporter to the United States European Command, and DLA-Pacific, supporter of the 
United States Pacific Command, DLA-C will engage customers throughout the U.S. 
CENTCOM AOR and its 27 nations to maximize War-fighter readiness and logistics 
combat power through coordination and synchronization of an enterprise solution.83 
d. Deployable LSC 
Unlike the initiatives discussed above, the Deployable Logistical Support 
Center (LSC) has not been implemented; however, it has been identified as a possible 
solution to existing deficiencies in expeditionary logistics support.  As currently 
envisioned, the deployable LSC teams would consist of a core of 2-3 Logistical Support 
Representatives (LSRs) tasked to provide logistical support to naval forces in ports or 
operating areas where little or no infrastructure exists. The team’s capabilities can be 
expanded through the partnering with DLA, regional NRCCs, ELSF, and other NAVSUP 
capabilities. Deployable LSCs would OPCON to the naval component and would be 
placed TACON to a naval support element, CTF, or ALSS/FLS.84  The deployable LSC 
teams could reside at a FISC and serve a specific geographical area.  The support would 
be provided to naval forces operating in remote areas not currently supported by any 
other logistical infrastructure such as expeditionary forces deployed inshore. 
e. Operational and Tactical Initiatives Sub Conclusion 
The operational/tactical initiatives, effectively applied, will provide a more 
robust logistics system for the naval expeditionary forces.  These initiatives will facilitate 
the supply ordering, shipment tracking, storage, and issue process through a streamlined 
command and control organization, which is utilizing the most advanced electronic 
technology and procedures. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The logistics support system in place in NAVCENT is a complex, multi-faceted 
system tasked with a difficult mission - operational logistics support to deployed naval 
forces.  The portions of that system that support naval expeditionary forces have an even 
more difficult task - providing support for those forces over the shore in a hostile, combat 
environment.  This chapter provides analysis of some of the factors discussed previously, 
attempts to draw some critical conclusions from that analysis, and provides 
recommendations for applying this analysis to improve the system and the support 
provided to the naval expeditionary forces.   
A.  ANALYSIS 
The Organizational Systems Framework provided a detailed tool to break-down 
this complex system into a series of inter-related parts: inputs, design factors, and outputs 
and outcomes.  This section analyzes the importance of those factors and discusses how 
they impact the overall system in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.  Due to the scope 
of this research and the limited time and resources available, quantitative analysis did not 
prove to be practical.  As the first step in a review of a very complicated system, we 
recommend follow-on research to further explore specific areas of the system and provide 
quantitative analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness of these areas.  We derive our 
assessments from numerous interviews with key leaders and participants in the logistics 
system, analysis of lessons-learned and after-action reports, and reviews of findings of 
other governmental agencies.  Furthermore, this research appears to be the first 
comprehensive assessment of the entire logistics system supporting all naval 
expeditionary communities.  This view is evidenced by the response from senior 
expeditionary logistics leaders at the Expeditionary Support Policy Council conference in 
October 2004, where they expressed the opinion that they had never seen the entire 
system analyzed as one large, inter-related system of parts. 
1. Inputs to the System 
a. Environment and Context and Key Success Factors 
The NAVCENT logistics system faces demanding environmental and 
contextual factors. Budget constraints are always a factor that affects the overall system 
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capabilities. This exogenous aspect is tied in to one of the system’s key success factors; 
right cost. Moreover, in the physical hazard of combat, expeditionary forces are operating 
away from their normal lines of supply, force protection requirements lead to 
unpredictability, and destruction of shipments produces greater variability in delivery 
time. Moreover, combat losses and battle damage repair, coupled with variability in 
OPTEMPO, make forecasting demand difficult. Consequently, logisticians in the 
expeditionary units have to establish new relationships and support processes compared 
to homeport routines, and the NAVCENT service providers need to serve different 
customers than they may be normally accustomed to. However, the system’s key success 
factors - right stuff, right place, right time, and right cost - will remain the same. 
b. System Direction 
Based on the environmental and success factors, the logistics system gets 
its direction from several levels and sources.  First, the President’s focus on the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT) implies a certain direction in terms of the types of operations 
logistics planners must be capable of supporting and the environments they will be 
working in.  This vision is incorporated in doctrine. Secondly, logistics doctrine exists at 
various levels, including joint doctrine, service-specific doctrine and community-specific 
doctrine. These documents outline the hierarchy of forces and corresponding 
requirements within NAVCENT, as well as NAVCENT’s role as a service component 
commander under the theater combatant commander, CENTCOM.  Joint doctrine states 
that combatant commanders exercise command authority over assigned forces within 
their geographic AOR, meaning that the combatant commander is responsible for joint 
theater logistics and maintains directive authority for logistics.  However, the combatant 
commander may determine that common servicing is ideal and can assign responsibility 
for providing or coordinating service for all Service components to the dominant user of 
that service.  
Given the scope and interdependencies within the logistics system, it is 
important to understand and implement doctrine at all levels. Adherence to the defined 
command relationship and responsibilities is a prerequisite for an effective joint theater 
logistics infrastructure and its ability to support achievement of strategic, operational and 
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tactical objectives. For example, it is important for NSW force planners to identify and 
determine authorities and responsibilities in the theater of operations to coordinate 
support services and organic assets to fulfill requirements.  Combatant commanders and 
theater Service component commanders, in coordination with the Theater Special 
Operations Command (TSOC), are responsible for ensuring that effective and responsive 
SOF support systems are developed and provided for assigned SOF.85 Further, it is the 
responsibility of the TSOC commander or the Joint Force Special Operations Component 
Commander (JFSOCC), or Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(CDRJSOTF), on behalf of the combatant commander, to validate the logistics 
requirements necessary to support theater operations.  
Additionally, logistics theory and principles provide direction to the 
system. These principles - responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, 
survivability - give direction to the logistics planners in designing a system to optimize 
support for the naval expeditionary war-fighter. Finally, individual community missions 
state what these forces must accomplish, and their corresponding logistics needs. 
2. Design Factors 
a. Tasks and Functions 
Over the past 25 years, the Navy has devoted considerable resources to 
developing a robust logistics support system in the NAVCENT AOR.  This NAVCENT 
theater network has continually improved, consistently proving itself very capable of 
sustaining potent naval forces in combat in a very challenging environment.  Within 
NAVCENT, various agencies and organizations provide support to cover all of the 
logistics functions and tasks discussed in Chapter III.  However, this network is largely 
focused on support for forces at sea in the Arabian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and Red  
Sea.  Furthermore, one of the key lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
is that the U.S. military needs to improve its integration of transportation and distribution 




                                                   
85 US DoD, (2003), Joint Doctrine Publication 3-05, Joint Special Operations. 
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b. Technology and Processes 
Each expeditionary community utilizes the same fundamental processes of 
communicating requirements back to support elements and tracking the distribution and 
delivery of material forward.  However, our description of the system has revealed that 
each expeditionary community has developed unique processes and systems to facilitate 
their logistics support.  Each community places a different emphasis on these processes, 
and has achieved different levels of sophistication in developing their systems.  
Furthermore, each community has different levels of organic logistic support capabilities.  
Therefore, we conclude that there may be efficiencies to be gained by streamlining these 
parallel processes into one integrated system for the expeditionary communities. 
c. Organization and Structure 
The logistics system appears to be adequate to support naval expeditionary 
forces, because the human resources and capabilities are in place to meet all logistics 
functions, as we have demonstrated in the previous sections describing logistics Tasks 
and Functions and Technology and Processes.  In addition, these sections demonstrated 
that procedures are established for effective logistics command and control.  
Furthermore, the doctrine that governs logistics command and control is well established, 
as we described in the System Direction section.  However, the logistics system appears 
to be highly fragmented.  Numerous sources of support exist among the Navy and other 
services, while some individual communities establish pre-positioned stock, or rely on 
reach-back to CONUS, for support that is available elsewhere in the theater.  
Additionally, a lack of doctrinal understanding and implementation has led to vague 
authorities, relationships and responsibilities.  That vagueness is the basis for this 
research, as naval expeditionary communities operate physically removed from 
traditional Navy logistics support, but do not always have access to the joint or inter-
service support provided by the Army or Marine Corps ashore. 
3. Organizational Culture 
Chapter III identified several key cultural outcomes of the existing logistics 
support system.  These cultural outcomes have had an important impact on the efficiency 
and execution of the logistics system. 
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a. Conflicting Motivations and Mindsets 
The conflicting motivations between customer/war-fighters and logistics 
service providers are not unique to the expeditionary communities, but there are 
examples of conflict throughout the fleet.  This customer mind-set is fed by the Navy’s 
proud tradition of problem solving at the lowest level.  This is ingrained into every 
Officer and Sailor from their earliest training.  This is also true of some of the individual 
communities.  The motto of the Seabee’s, “Can Do!” signifies their willingness to 
overcome any challenge to get the job done.  While this is obviously commendable at the 
tactical level, it perpetuates some logistics problems by masking their true impact on 
mission readiness and accomplishment.  Work-arounds and off-line reach-back to 
homeport for material requirements may solve a problem in the short-term, but it can 
compromise the supply system’s ability to meet long-term needs.  Furthermore, this 
practice prevents solutions from being undertaken at the appropriate level, and can lead to 
multiple, parallel solutions being implemented for the same problem.   
b. Service and Community Parochialism 
One major impact of service and community parochialism is in the 
development of information systems, where parallel, “stove-piped” systems have led to 
redundancy, inefficiency, and a lack of inter-operability between organizations, 
communities, and the various services.  For example, several expeditionary communities 
have undertaken separate initiatives to develop a logistics information system that can 
support deployed operations for their community.  Recently, they have combined their 
efforts under the Expeditionary Support Policy Council’s IT Working Group.  However, 
had this not been done, each community could have developed, funded, and fielded 
separate systems that would have done essentially the same functions.  Clearly, this 
would be a redundant and inefficient course of action. 
However, service parochialism goes beyond the scope of physical system 
procurement.  Interviews and lessons-learned documents indicated that some 
communities (or at least some deployed units) were unaware of the joint theater 
distribution system in place to move material up from Kuwait or distribute it from 
logistics sites in Iraq.  USTRANSCOM and CENTCOM have made great strides in 
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improving the flow of material throughout the theater.  However, some of these units are 
not tapping in to this system, but are relying instead on costly organic transportation 
assets and routes to get their needed material. 
c. Force Protection and Shifting Organizational Values 
The cultural impact of force protection and security is evident through a 
shifting of organizational values.  In view of the grave threat to forces posed by terrorists, 
the preeminent organizational value has now become force protection and security of 
forces, installations, and resources.  While performance, efficiency, and mission 
accomplishment are certainly still critical values of the organization, this research found 
numerous instances where the need to ensure safety and security prevailed over these 
values when making strategic, operational, or tactical logistics decisions.   
One such impact is in areas where logistics support may need to be 
expanded to meet the new needs of the war in Iraq.  Expanded services will require more 
people, and possibly new or larger bases.  This larger footprint now requires a larger 
security force to protect it, which then requires more personnel support (barracks, galley, 
etc), which require still more people to operate.  Thus, it becomes a conflict with the 
policy of reducing the manpower (i.e., terrorist target) in theater.  Naturally, the higher 
priority for the NAVCENT commander is the security of his forces.  Therefore, the need 
for expanded logistics support in theater loses out to the need to reduce force levels, 
particularly non-war-fighting forces. 
This policy directly manifested itself in the removal of families from 
Bahrain early in 2004.  All DoD personnel are now on one year unaccompanied tours to 
Bahrain.  This decision then resulted in a new cultural outcome; a dramatic decrease in 
motivation of the personnel providing some logistics services86.  The impact is difficult to 
quantify, but leaders expressed a deep concern about a marked decrease in quality of 
service provided as personnel shifted their focus away from their work and towards new, 
emergent personal concerns.  For example, a one-year tour means that the person is 
leaving the job only shortly after becoming effective in that job.  It is a constant cycle of 
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Command, 28 Oct 2004. 
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training a new relief and preparing to leave for the Sailor’s next assignment.  Also, that 
Sailor will begin negotiating for orders to that next assignment very soon after arriving in 
Bahrain, once again shifting his focus away from the very important job at hand.  Also 
difficult to quantify, but acknowledged as a detractor, is the impact on that Sailor of 
being on an unaccompanied tour away from his or her family for 12 months, leading to 
increased financial, emotional, or medical issues for both the Sailor and their family back 
in the United States. 
This policy also had a negative impact on the DoD civilian work force 
supporting NAVCENT.  The one-year unaccompanied tour policy is compounded by the 
fact that civilians do not qualify for many of the financial incentives that military 
members enjoy while assigned to Bahrain.  These incentives include Imminent Danger 
Pay, Family Separation Allowance, and Combat Zone Tax Exclusions.  The result is that 
many civilians are choosing not to extend their tours at the end of the year.  Furthermore, 
when they leave, it is increasingly difficult to get a replacement to come from CONUS, 
as there is no incentive to do so.  That worker would get paid basically the same amount 
of money, as they would get to live in Omaha, with their family, and without the threat of 
a terrorist attack.   
The impact is particularly critical in civilian-intensive organizations in 
NAVCENT, such as the NRCC in Bahrain.  One leader estimated that NRCC civilian 
manning was approaching 50 percent.  Unlike other aspects previously discussed, this 
impact is relatively easy to quantify, as NRCC’s throughput capacity for processing  
contracts would also decrease to roughly 50 percent of its intended capacity.  
Furthermore, additional analysis has already shown a probable need to increase NRCC 
contracting capacity to provide support to the naval forces deployed in Iraq. 
4. Outputs and Outcomes 
The NAVCENT logistics system is a detailed, efficiently functioning system or 
service providers.  The logistics Tasks and Functions section in Chapter III illustrated 
that NAVCENT and CENTCOM have all the necessary resources and capabilities to 
meet all logistics functions. Although the NAVCENT logistics system is adequate, its 
operational reach is dictated by supporting maritime forces at-sea.  During OIF, 
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expeditionary forces operating in areas with limited or no existing infrastructure had to be 
self-reliant and/or, partner with other services for logistics support. This proved 
problematic at times when determining the assignment and responsibility for common 
item support such as transportation, contracting and health services support. Further, the 
majority of the logistics challenges experienced by the naval expeditionary forces were 
from an ineffective joint theater distribution network and poor intra-theater asset 
visibility.  As one senior logistician stated, “DoD is failing logistics personnel by putting 
them in the position of having to work around the system in order support units forward.” 
5. Overall Logistics System Execution 
Despite the human capabilities and established doctrine, the size and complexity 
of the logistics system influences its execution. System execution includes making 
assumptions about the operating environment, assessing the organization’s capabilities, 
linking strategy to operations and the people who are going to implement the strategy, 
synchronizing those people and their various disciplines and linking rewards to outcomes. 
In its most fundamental sense, execution is a systematic way of exposing reality and 
acting on it87. In a human factor perspective, this research identifies cross-functional 
awareness and understanding of roles and relationships as two major areas of 
improvement, as we will illustrate in a later section of this chapter. 
Cross-functional awareness can be viewed as the anti-dote to “stove-piped” 
entities. But as it currently stands, logistics support of expeditionary forces seems to run 
the risk of getting too focused on the respective units. Awareness and integration with 
higher echelons will likely suffer from this situation. Establishing individual support 
mechanisms within the logistics system, rather than understanding what resources already 
exist and allowing the system to operate as intended, reduces overall system efficiency.  
Furthermore, it risks fragmenting the forces rather than integrating them.  Given the 
social complexity - the number and diversity of players, structural relationships, and 
extensive geographical range of the logistics personnel, and the technical complexity - 
the number of technologies that are involved, the immense number of possible 
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interactions among them and the rate of technical change88, the challenge is to create an 
integrated logistics system that pulls together the assets from all four services into a 
comprehensive whole. 
The logistics system’s execution will not improve unless each entity adopts a 
more systemic view on logistics support, meaning a greater awareness and commitment 
to the already established structures and capabilities. Integral rather than separative 
initiatives, collaborative rather than solitary attitudes, and trustfulness rather than 
doubtfulness on behalf of the Big Navy are values that each entity can pursue. In addition 
to improved system execution, these features seem to support the future transformation 
initiatives that assume joint efforts.  The NCF initiatives to standardize their support 
systems with the Marine Corps’ practices are excellent examples of constructive efforts 
to improve the system’s overall execution. In terms of technical complexity, 
standardization of support systems and terminology will ease the cross-functional 
interaction between logistics planners on any level and between any services in the 
logistics system. 
The size and complexity of the logistics system requires unambiguous principles 
and definitions of its intended division of responsibilities. A system without these 
clarifications will be chaotic and degrade performance.  Although this research suggests 
that the logistics system to support naval expeditionary forces is adequate and that 
doctrine is established, we have found evidence suggesting limitations in system 
execution.  These limitations, in our view, result from a lack of doctrine implementation. 
A doctrine is an overarching document that provides system direction and some 
critical definitions, such as roles and relationships. Despite its subordinate perspectives, 
this document is important on any level in the organization. In order to implement it, 
however, operational leaders and logistics planners from each service and expeditionary 
community must translate and shape the doctrinal concepts into meaningful operating 
terms for their own units, based on the applicable concepts of operations for each  
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community.  The expeditionary forces subject to this report have not fully applied this 
doctrine.  Accordingly this represents an important area of consideration for improved 
system execution. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The research question underlying this report asks whether there are potential areas 
within the NAVCENT logistics system to target for improvement, restructuring or 
realignment to better support the expeditionary units in the CENTCOM AOR. Based on 
the OSF, a gap analysis of expeditionary community requirements and the logistics 
system capabilities suggests a set of answers to the question.  This section presents these 
findings.  Based on the fact that naval expeditionary forces are mission capable and 
successfully deployed in combat operations in Iraq, the overall results of the logistics 
system are adequate. However, in addition to the various strategic and operational 
initiatives and changes that are currently being introduced, this report constructively 
addresses certain areas for improvement that seek to contribute to the feedback loop that 
continuously evaluates and adapts the logistics system.  These recommendations are 
detailed in Section C of this chapter. 
1. Logistics System Design is Adequate 
This conclusion is supported by two key findings; all required logistics functions, 
tasks, and capabilities are established and in place with the NAVCENT and CENTCOM 
logistics system, and doctrine to define the roles and responsibilities for joint, service, 
and community logistics support is established and available. 
a. Logistics System Functions and Capabilities are Adequate 
The design of the logistics system is sufficient to support naval 
expeditionary forces.  Within the Central Command AOR, the functions of supply, 
transportation and logistics command and control are met by a network of service 
providers and command and control elements at both the theater (CENTCOM) and 
service component (NAVCENT) levels. This network effectively merges elements of 
strategic and operational pre-positioning and stock consolidation points with 
transportation and distribution via sea, air, and land multi-modal hubs and assets to  
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successfully support naval forces at sea or on land. COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53, 
DESC-Middle East, NRCC Bahrain, and the NAVCENT transportation network are 
central providers in this system. 
NAVCENT provides logistics command and control through a variety of 
task specific groups (CTGs) within CTF-53, including NAVELSF forces and the 
temporary LRC. Moreover, in order to reduce military force structure, DoD relies 
extensively on civilian contractors and local vendors for goods and services. At the 
community level, sufficient organic capabilities are in place in the NSW forces, NCF 
forces and Fleet Hospitals. Deployed EOD units assign logistics as a collateral function 
within the unit, and are, thus, dependent on being collocated with a support command 
while deployed. 
From a human factor perspective, the motivation, focus, and mind set, 
coupled with the training, knowledge and expertise of the experienced logisticians, 
suggests that the system is adequate.  The organic logistics capabilities within the 
expeditionary units lead to a high level of commitment and professionalism at the unit 
level. Logistics personnel adopt the language and identity associated with expeditionary 
operations, and their training and experience make them well suited for execution of the 
logistics functions. 
b. Logistics Doctrine is Established 
Extensive Joint and Navy doctrine exists for all aspects of operational 
logistics support.  The NAVCENT logistics system has established doctrine and 
procedures that provide breakdown and distribution of work, tasks, functions and roles 
and responsibilities of the key groups and individuals in the organization.  Readily 
available publications at the theater level assist naval theater logisticians in adapting the 
logistics system to provide Navy expeditionary forces with support and sustainment.  
Based on this finding, we do not believe there is a need for any new doctrine to be 
created that would improve expeditionary support. 
2. System Execution is Not Optimal 
Although the logistics system has adequate resources, capabilities, and doctrine 
and in place in the theater, we found some customers had difficulty getting access to 
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some of these resources.  Furthermore, we found an apparent lack of awareness of how to 
implement the established doctrine.  The result was that the manner in which the doctrine 
is implemented and these resources allocated is less than optimal in supporting naval 
expeditionary forces.  
a. Access to Some Logistics Resources and Capabilities is Difficult 
Although this research found that all required logistics functions and 
capabilities are in place with the NAVCENT system, lessons learned data and interviews 
highlighted a lack of awareness of and ability to gain access to some of these capabilities 
for the deployed expeditionary customers. 
For example, lessons learned from the NCF indicated that they were not 
aware of the Army-run CENTCOM theater ground transportation and distribution 
network, or the logistics command and control capabilities of the CENTCOM 
Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (CDDOC) in Kuwait.  Feedback from a 
Fleet Hospital logistician indicated a similar lack of awareness, in that he by chance 
found a Defense Supply Center-Philadelphia (DSCP) representative working in Iraq.  
Once aware that that resource was available to him, he was able to get a great deal of 
assistance from that representative in expediting logistics requirements.  However, he 
expressed concern that there was no standard process in place to advertise those services 
to the many units in the region who could benefit from the assistance. 
Another aspect of difficulty in accessing logistics support was through 
interoperability of logistics C2 and information systems.  The NCF unit embedded in the 
MEF had no training on using Marine Corps logistics information systems, such as 
ATLASS, to requisition and track material requirements.  The NCF relied on the Navy 
MicroSNAP system, which did not interface with ATLASS.  Therefore, they had 
difficulty accessing their primary point of supply for most of their non-Class IV material 
requirements due to non-interoperable systems. 
Other, similar, lessons learned data led to the conclusion that a lack of 
interoperable or common logistics C2 and information systems is creating a barrier to 
effectively accessing some logistics support capabilities, systems, and processes. 
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b. Lack of Awareness or Implementation of Doctrine, Roles, and 
Responsibilities 
As discussed in the previous section, this research led to the conclusion 
that the existing joint, Navy, and community-specific operational and logistics doctrine is 
well thought out and thorough.  However, a common theme throughout the research was 
a lack of awareness or understanding of that doctrine, what it actually meant, and how it 
could or should be implemented.  This conclusion applied both to how the expeditionary 
communities seek out and obtain support as well as to NAVCENT’s self-perceived role 
in supporting those expeditionary forces. 
For example, NCF Lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom 
indicated that the formal structure to implement doctrine providing for Marine Corps 
support for SEABEE units was not well established prior to deploying into Iraq.  
Consequently, the processes for implementing support, and the levels of support to be 
provided, had to be established between each SEABEE unit and their supporting MEF as 
they rotated into the theater.  There was no systematic method involved in establishing 
support, and issues were worked out as they arose.  The result is that supported units 
could not accurately predict prior to deploying what types of support they would receive 
and what levels they actually would be supported at.  This is not to fault the SEABEEs or 
the Marine Corps, but rather to point out that the actual implementation of the stated 
doctrine did not provide for the degree of integration that was intended. 
Another example of implementation of doctrine is in NAVCENT’s focus 
on at-sea logistics support.  NAVCENT’s focus on at-sea support is understandable and 
in-line with the Navy’s logistics core competencies. However, as a service component 
commander, NAVCENT has responsibility for providing logistics support for U.S. Navy 
forces in theater, regardless of whether they are at sea or ashore.  This responsibility 
necessitates a greater role for NAVCENT in supporting deployed naval expeditionary 
units, even after they cross the beach to operate ashore. 
3. The Logistics System is Fragmented and Lacks Integration 
Numerous, unaligned logistics service providers, operating on different logistics 
C2 systems, lead to a logistics system that fragmented and lacks integration.  Social and 
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technological fragmentation represents fragmenting forces to the logistics system. 
Consequently, logisticians that support expeditionary forces run the risk of getting too 
focused on their respective units, and losing a wider strategic view.  Awareness and 
integration with higher echelons and cross-functional entities suffers from this attitude. 
Lessons learned repeatedly discussed how units establish alternate support mechanisms 
within the logistics system.  From this, one can conclude that this fragmentation leads to 
inefficiencies in the system due to inadequate asset utilization. Furthermore, lack of 
doctrinal understanding and implementation at the tactical level adversely affects system 
execution. The existing doctrine is not translated and shaped to fit the expeditionary 
forces at the unit level.  Incomplete implementation leads to blurred execution of roles 
and responsibilities, and creating a disconnect between support processes and intended 
support relationships. 
Furthermore, some aspects of fragmentation seem to stem from the cultural 
outcomes of the logistics system. There is a difference in perspectives and mindsets 
between the logistics customers and their service providers resulting from conflicting 
motivations. The customer/War-fighter does whatever is necessary to accomplish the 
mission, whereas the logistics providers may be more motivated by following an 
established process, and less focused on the ultimate outcome of that process. Much of 
these mindsets come down to specific metrics these units and individuals are held 
accountable for on evaluations and inspections. In other words, the logistics system’s 
incentive structure seems to encourage short-term solutions such as work-around and off-
line reach-back to homeport. Furthermore, it prevents solutions from being undertaken at  
the appropriate level, and can lead to multiple, parallel solutions being implemented for 
the same problem.  Logic dictates that these parallel solutions not only create further 
inefficiencies, but also perpetuate the fragmentation of the larger system. 
a. Integration of NAVCENT with CENTCOM Theater Logistics 
System  
This research recommends a review of both the NAVCENT and 
CENTCOM logistics systems to identify an overlap of capabilities and/or logistics 
support gaps. Closer planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization are 
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recommended among the logistics support in the expeditionary communities, NAVCENT 
and CENTCOM to determine how to best leverage existing resources and capabilities to 
meet customer demands and expectations. Simply, the best course of action may be to re-
allocate existing intra-theater resources and capabilities and/or redefine the roles and 
relationships of service providers to optimize support and reduce redundant functions and 
processes.  In doing so, logistics planners will identify where inadequate logistics support 
exists and linkages between shared task responsibilities to establish lead-partner 
relationships (i.e., executive agent and dominant-user responsibilities) in an effort to 
make the logistics system more responsive, adaptive and flexible.  Limited logistics 
resources, combined with reduced force infrastructure, fewer forward locations, austere 
operating locations with limited infrastructure, and increased joint operations in the 
battlespace make it imperative to capitalize on the assets and capabilities in theater to 
facilitate support to the war-fighter.89  
One area were this may be critical is in contracting support.  One solution 
for naval expeditionary support is to rely on Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps 
contracting resources in Iraq.  The combination of NRCC, Bahrain’s civilian workforce 
challenges and limited access to Iraq support this.  Furthermore, the Army has taken the 
lead for contracting issues within the theater. 
Another critical area for integration with CENTCOM logistics systems is 
in ammunition and ordnance support for naval expeditionary forces.  
COMLOGFORNAVCENT/CTF-53 coordinates all theater ordnance movement and 
provides naval ordnance logistics support in the region.  However, their role is limited to 
that of a facilitator of ordnance movement. Consequently, the Navy does not maintain 
any ordnance stock points within the theater, and relies on ordnance stocks embarked on 
CLF ships deployed in theater.  This is significant to naval expeditionary forces, in that 
there are no Navy ammunition supply points ashore.  Furthermore, the need to reduce the 
force footprint ashore, due to force protection concerns, makes it unfeasible for a navy 
ammunition stock point to be constructed.  Instead, naval expeditionary forces rely on 
                                                   
89 U.S. DoD, (2000), Joint Doctrine Publication 4-0, Logistics Support of Joint Operations. 
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Marine and Army ammunition stock points for small arms ammunition, explosives and 
munitions. In the case of NSW- and EOD-unique requirements, those communities rely 
extensively on community reach-back support in CONUS to meet their needs. 
Consequently, delays and lead times could complicate responsive logistics support.  
However, feedback from the affected communities indicate that the combination of inter-
service and reach back support adequately meet their ammunition requirements. 
Another opportunity to benefit from integration is in ground transportation 
and distribution for expeditionary units.  NAVCENT’s ground transportation lines are the 
least robust part of its transportation and distribution network. Currently, the Navy relies 
on the Army or deployed Navy expeditionary support units for theater-level ground 
transportation. Part of this is due to the fact that many of these units deployed in Iraq are 
supporting the Army or the Marine Corps directly, or are part of combined joint task 
forces. The logistics consequences of this may be lack of flexibility and increased 
coordination between the services. 
It is essential, therefore, for naval expeditionary forces to leverage both 
NAVCENT and CENTCOM logistics system capabilities and resources to achieve 
maximum logistics support, economies of scale and reduce their overall logistics 
footprint. This can be accomplished by adopting and employing the strategic, operational 
and tactical logistics initiatives discussed earlier in the Feedback and Initiatives section 
of Chapter III. 
b. Integration of Naval Expeditionary Communities into Service-
Wide Support 
One of the key findings of this research was that the four expeditionary 
communities examined operate separate and apart from established logistics support 
systems of the Navy or other services.  Although doctrine exists for providing support 
from various sources, analysis determined that these communities often are not following 
this doctrine in a systematic manner.  This is not to say that these communities are not 
obtaining support from these systems.  Rather, support is obtained through informal local  
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networking or leveraging organic capabilities, often less efficiently than may be possible 
through full integration.  There is little or no consistent, systematic reliance on any one 
system for a particular type of support.  
The basic approach to integration across these communities, and then 
upward with the various services, is to identify linkages between shared support 
responsibilities and requirements, and establish lead-partner relationships among the 
stakeholders.  In most cases, one community can be identified as either the primary 
provider of support or the primary generator of requirements for a certain type of support.  
In that case, it makes sense for that community to take the lead on those issues, while 
collaborating with other communities that have a stake in that area. 
For example, the Army and Marine Corps are currently working together 
on the development of the Global Combat Support System (GCSS), an information 
system for managing readiness and support for ground combat weapons systems.  The 
Army has the lead on development of the system.  However, the Marine Corps joined in 
as a partner in the development, since they operate many of the same weapons systems 
and essentially operate in the same manner as the Army.  This system may provide a 
solution to naval expeditionary forces in managing support and readiness for their 
equipment, as well. 
Conversely, one important lesson taken from OIF was that the Seabee’s 
have more refined expertise in Class IV material management than the Marine or Army 
combat engineers.  Viewed as their “bullets,” Class IV material is the building and 
construction material needed for Seabee’s to conduct their construction projects.  Based 
on this lesson, one initiative being explored by the NCF and the Marine Corps is to 
integrate the system for Class IV requirement generation and material procurement and 
management.  While under the operational control of the Marine Engineer Group (MEG), 
a sub-component of the MEF, the Class IV requirements for both services could be 
managed by the Seabee’s.  The Seabees would assume a lead relationship, with the 
Marine Corps as a partner.  The Project Material Planning and Tracking Program 
(PMPT), an information system for automating Class IV support, could play a role in this  
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cross-service integration.  Furthermore, the relationship could be extended to combat 
engineer units in the Army and Air Force, when deployed in a large-scale theater 
operation such as OIF. 
4. The Threat of Terrorism and Force Protection Requirements Have 
Had a Negative Effect on the Logistics Support System 
Finally, force protection and security has become a major issue for NAVCENT in 
Bahrain, and has led to some controversial policy decisions.  The threat of terrorism in 
the region is forcing a reduction in forces to only those absolutely essential to completing 
the mission at hand. This is driving policy decisions that support lower force levels at the 
expense of quantity and quality of logistics services provided. Discontinuation of certain 
financial incentives, especially concerning the DoD civilian work force supporting 
NAVCENT, reinforces this negative cycle.  
In order to reduce the military footprint and secure American military families in 
Bahrain, the Navy moved these families back to CONUS and changed all assignments to 
one year unaccompanied tours. Besides the fact that Sailors are deployed unaccompanied 
for year-long assignments and the corresponding morale issues, external factors in the 
logistics system have had some unforeseen consequences, such as difficulties with 
command and control, language barriers, cultural differences, lack of professionalism, 
and hijackings, kidnappings and assassinations.   
In Iraq, the insurgents’ intent is to disrupt the flow of material to U.S. forces, 
discourage vendors from seeking additional contracts, and eliminate all local material 
support.  Tactics such as road-side bombs, highjackings, kidnappings, and beatings have 
become commonplace.  Local vendors, fearing for their safety, have defaulted on 
contracts, reducing the numbers of sources of supply for some materials, such as Class IV 
building materials for the SEABEE’s that are traditionally sourced through the local 
economy.  This creates a new logistics challenge, as alternate sources must be found.  
Convoy routes and vendor delivery points have been altered to mitigate the threat.  
However, increased physical security requirements divert manpower away from 
operational or logistics duties, further degrading the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
process.   
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Although we have reached valid conclusions on the negative impact terrorism, 
and the resultant force protection policies, have on the effectiveness and optimization of 
the logistics system, recommendations to improve this aspect is beyond the scope of this 
research or the expertise of the researchers.  Certainly, every effort to protect Sailors, 
Marines, civilian workers, and family members must be made.  The importance of 
logistics efficiency and effectiveness is clearly overshadowed by the need to protect 
human lives.  However, logistics planners should be aware of, anticipate, and plan for this 
impact when assessing their requirements and capabilities. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The findings of this report suggest that the NAVCENT logistics system in support 
of naval expeditionary forces is adequate, but less than optimal.  Based on these findings, 
there are several recommendations proposed to achieve the MBA project’s goal of 
establishing a more effective and efficient logistics system in support of naval 
expeditionary forces.  First, we recommend improving the understanding and awareness 
of existing logistics support doctrine, thereby seeking to execute the logistics system the 
way the established doctrine intends it be executed.  Secondly, we recommend 
developing common and/or inter-operable logistics command and control and 
information systems, thereby facilitating more effective and efficient access to all 
available logistics resources in the theater.  Finally, we recommend against implementing 
the proposed Deployable Logistics Support Center, as its current concept of operations 
will not provide any new logistics capabilities or resources that are not already available 
in the theater. 
1. Improve Understanding and Awareness of Doctrine, Roles, and 
Responsibilities 
Naval expeditionary forces operating ashore unilaterally or in a joint environment 
must recognize the extent of their own organic logistics capabilities and the logistic 
support to be provided by parent service or between service components.  Therefore, it is 
essential for expeditionary forces to be familiar with the geographical theater logistics 
systems’ organizations and structures and the authorities and responsibilities for logistic 
operations prior to entering a joint area of operation.   
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Joint and Navy doctrine is a primary source for understanding these roles and 
responsibilities.  Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint 
Operations, and Naval Doctrine Publication 4, Naval Logistics, are the primary 
publications for logistics doctrine.  However, more detailed doctrine for specific logistic 
functions or services or for specific types of operations is presented in subordinate 
publications in the JP 4-0 and NDP or NWP 4 series.  For example, service component 
commanders should refer to Naval Warfare Publication 4-01.1, Navy Expeditionary 
Shore Based Logistic Support and Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and 
Integration Operations, which assists naval theater logisticians in adapting the logistics 
system to provide Navy expeditionary shore-based logistics support and sustainment.  
Joint publications are available online in the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) at 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel.  Navy doctrine publications are available through the JEL at 
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs or through the Navy Warfare Development 
Command at www.nwdc.navy.mil/library/documents/ndps.  
Furthermore, the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) program provides 
formal training on joint doctrine.  These courses are taught through the Naval War 
College for Navy officers, and are available either through in-resident study in Newport, 
Rhode Island, or through various non-resident “fleet seminars” in major fleet 
concentration areas, including the Naval Postgraduate School.  Currently, JPME Phase 1 
certification is only required for Unrestricted Line officers, but is highly encouraged for 
restricted line and staff corps officers.  However, since most logistics planners discussed 
in this report are Supply Corps officers, it is recommended that they receive this training. 
Another, less formal, recommendation for improving understanding of logistics 
support roles and responsibilities is a pre-deployment brief and desk-top or electronic 
guide for logistics resources in the theater.  The brief should be conducted prior to 
deployment, and give specific details of organizations and resources available, what their 
capabilities are, how to access them, and how services or materials are paid for.  The 
desk-top guide would provide similar information in a reference format that the  
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deploying supply or logistics officer could take with them into theater.  It would help 
them initially set up a support network, ensuring they have access to needed resources as 
requirements emerge. 
2. Develop Common/Inter-Operable Logistics Processes, Information 
Systems, and Command and Control Systems  
A key finding of this research was the need to fully integrate these expeditionary 
communities into the larger service logistics support systems, allowing them to leverage 
these more robust capabilities for improved support while deployed ashore.  The tool to 
enable integration and optimize system execution is common logistics processes, 
information systems, and command and control (C2) systems.  Common processes and 
systems allow efficient sharing of data, expediting requirements and potentially 
improving readiness.  They can also achieve cost savings through virtual consolidation of 
inventory and improved asset visibility and in-transit visibility.   
The long-standing reliance throughout DoD on community-specific processes and 
systems has hampered joint and service integration at all levels.  When USTRANSCOM 
began consolidating and integrating distribution functions as the Distribution Process 
Owner (DPO), they encountered nearly 300 separate information systems involved in 
material distribution across the services.  These redundant and incompatible systems 
greatly complicated the task of consolidating that function.  The consequences of separate 
IT systems are that some units do not tap into the existing joint theater distribution 
system, and rely instead on costly, organic transportation assets and routes to get their 
needed material. 
Therefore, expeditionary communities should seek to integrate with and adopt 
service-wide processes and systems before developing new community-specific systems.  
Additionally, the expeditionary communities could benefit even more from looking 
beyond the Navy at logistics command and control systems that the Army and Marine 
Corps are using or developing for deployed logistics support ashore.  The Global Combat 
Support System (GCSS) is one such system being developed by the Army and Marine 
Corps as a common cross-service system to support their needs. 
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However, the answer to integration may not be as straight forward as simply 
integrating with the bigger Navy systems.  Rather, the best solution may lie with 
selectively integrating with the service support system that can provide the most robust 
and dependable support for that given function, requirement, or environment.  Support 
options provided by the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, or joint support processes 
need to be considered by the individual expeditionary communities.  
In the case of the NCF, the optimal course of action may be to integrate with the 
Marine Corps for ground combat support.  As has been previously discussed, NCF units 
deploy under the operational control of the MEF or MAGTF commander, and rely on the 
Marine logistics tail for support.  Therefore, formal integration with their systems and 
processes may provide the best level of support while deployed.  The NCF is already 
moving in this direction.  In a memorandum dated 19 Jul 2000, then-DCNO (Logistics) 
VADM J.F. Amerault directed the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NFEC) to 
develop a plan to improve their logistics systems and processes.  Their stated goal was to 
develop a logistics system that is “well integrated and more compatible with the rest of 
the Navy-Marine Corps team.”90 
It may be appropriate for the Fleet Hospitals to partially integrate with the Army 
logistics support systems.  Fleet Hospitals obtain logistics support from the Single 
Integrated Medical Logistics Manager (SIMLM), as designated by the theater Combatant 
Commander.  In CENTCOM, and in most cases, the Army is designated as the SIMLM. 
The recommended solution for NSW and EOD forces is not so clear.  These 
forces may operate independently, or be attached to larger forces of various services or 
other governmental agencies.  Their concept of operations is much more fluid and 
adaptable.  However, they share many commonalities in operations, weapons systems, 
and requirements with like forces of the other services.  Therefore, the optimal solution 
for these forces may be to develop a joint SOF support structure and logistics C2 systems.   
 
 
                                                   
90 Memorandum, DCNO (Logistics), (2000), Naval Construction Force Logistics Improvement. 
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3. Deployable Logistics Support Center (LSC) Not Recommended   
In the context of the NAVCENT AOR, the deployable logistics support center 
(LSC) is not recommended and may not add value to the current logistics support system. 
The deployable LSC concept would primarily provide short-term support for contingency 
operations for forward deployed expeditionary forces. The structure, capabilities and 
functions of the existing joint theater and Navy component logistics systems are adequate 
to support naval expeditionary forces. Further, there are adequate supporting mechanisms 
in place such as CTF-53, CDDOC, NAVCENT LRC, other Services (i.e. Marine Corps 
and Army), community organic logistics support, contingency contracting personnel, and 
NAVELSF personnel to provide operational logistics support to these forces.  
Instead, as discussed previously, closer planning and coordination is 
recommended among the logistics planners on the CENTCOM and Service component 
command staffs and within the expeditionary communities to determine how to best 
leverage existing resources and capabilities to meet their demands and expectations. 
Alternatively, there may be a role for the Deployable LSC as an integrator and logistics 
command and control element, either coordinating efforts between NAVCENT and 
CENTCOM, or between the expeditionary communities and NAVCENT.  However, that 
is a very different role and mission from that originally envisioned for the LCS.  If that 
change in the concept of operations is made, the proposed organization, manning, and 
capabilities of the Deployable LSC would have to be significantly altered.  Therefore, 
based on its current proposed concept of operations, creation of a Deployable Logistics 
Support Center is not recommended as a solution to improving logistics support to naval 
expeditionary forces. 
D.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has provided a comprehensive analysis of the over-arching doctrine, 
functions, and capabilities of the existing logistics system supporting naval expeditionary 
forces in the NAVCENT AOR.  It successfully identified commonalities and differences 
in the missions and concepts of operations for the four expeditionary communities, as 
well as the basic requirements that these operations generate.  However, there is still 
much research to be done to thoroughly analyze all the factors affecting support for these 
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forces.  Some areas for future research include detailed quantitative analysis of various 
aspects of the system, analysis of specific alternatives for common logistics support 
systems for these communities, the application of these findings beyond the NAVCENT 
area of operations, and the impact of future logistics initiatives on expeditionary support. 
1. Quantitative Analysis   
One major area for future research is in quantitative analysis of various aspects of 
the expeditionary logistics support system.  One area for concentration is in the 
capabilities and capacities of service providers in the NAVCENT AOR.  This research 
concluded that all of the logistics functions of supply, contracting, transportation, 
distribution, and command and control were currently provided for within NAVCENT, 
CENTCOM, and other joint and service agencies. However, the research did not look at 
the specific capacities of each of the various service providers.  Further analysis should 
consider their capacity to provide services, the amount of that capacity already taken up 
by existing support requirements, and their ability to absorb added requirements from 
naval expeditionary forces.  This analysis could quantify any deficit in capacity or 
capabilities, and make recommendations for increasing resources, if necessary, to support 
these forces.  One possible product may be a Cost/Benefit Analysis of alternative support 
options for filling these quantitative gaps. 
Conversely, further research can focus on quantitative analysis of expeditionary 
force logistics requirements, as well.  The task of quantifying requirements for each of 
these four communities is extensive, but also required.  One approach may be to analyze 
supply effectiveness metrics for expeditionary forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom,  
identifying specific shortfalls in supply stock levels, transportation and distribution 
throughput, etc.  One possible product may be the identification of Top 10 readiness 
degraders for each of the expeditionary communities. 
2. Information Technology 
Information technology plays a critical role in logistics support. Furthermore, it is 
the key behind many ongoing DoD and joint logistics initiatives.  Initiatives such as Total 
Asset Visibility, In-Transit Visibility, RFID, and the Joint Theater Logistics Management 
System all rely heavily on state-of-the-art informational technology tools and systems. 
 91
One area for future research may be to conduct a feasibility study of incorporating 
a common logistics IT system across all naval expeditionary communities.  Additionally, 
this research could examine the feasibility of adopting common systems with the Army 
or Marine Corps, since many naval expeditionary communities deploy and operate 
closely with these services.  An example of such a system is the Global Combat Support 
System (GCSS), currently being developed by the Army and Marine Corps as a common 
solution for sustainment of ground forces in theater.  This system may provide a suitable 
solution to support Navy forces, as well. 
3. Application to Other Theaters 
This research focused mainly on the infrastructure in place within the Central 
Command area of responsibility, and the lessons learned from the naval expeditionary 
forces deploying there.  However, the doctrinal principles discussed apply to all regions 
of the world.  Similar research could examine the logistics support systems in place in 
other theaters, such as Korea, the greater Pacific region in general, and Europe.  Such 
research could compare the infrastructure in those theaters with that of the NAVCENT 
and CENTCOM, and look for major differences that could affect support if/when naval  
expeditionary forces deploy into those theaters.  Some research is already being 
done in this area, as USTRANSCOM is considering deploying a Deployment and 
Distribution Operations Center (DDOC) to Korea, as it did in Kuwait. 
4. Impact of SEABasing 
Finally, the CNO’s SEAPower 21 is transforming the way the Navy approaches 
its mission for the 21st Century.  The concept of SEABasing is intended to give the Navy 
an even greater capability to sustain forces ashore from the sea.  This initiative will 
reduce the Navy’s dependence on shore-based infrastructure to sustain joint, Marine 
Corps, and Navy expeditionary forces.  It envisions a comprehensive system of afloat 
platforms independent of significant forward-area shore bases and facilities.   
This concept has the potential to radically change the way these four 
expeditionary communities will be supported when deployed in a combat or contingency 
operation.  In some cases, it will negate some of this research, dramatically changing the  
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concept of operations, doctrine, and processes of these communities.  However, in some 
cases, those changes will require closer ties to joint systems for naval expeditionary units, 
because SEABasing will greatly reduce the naval logistics footprint ashore. 
Further research can explore in detail the concepts, processes, and systems of the 
envisioned SEABase and apply that to the expeditionary logistics support system. 
E.  SUMMARY 
In summary, this research recommends integrating the logistic capabilities of the 
intra-theater service providers and naval expeditionary forces to fulfill war-fighter 
requirements. Identifying the intra-theater service providers and determining how to best 
leverage the capabilities and resources of these various services’ systems and support 
networks to meet naval expeditionary forces’ requirements, demands, and expectations 
accomplish this. In doing so, the overall theater logistics systems are effective and 
efficient and will not require external support mechanisms such as the deployable LSC 
during contingency operations. 
Although this research was successful in analyzing the logistics system in place to 
support naval expeditionary forces within the NAVCENT AOR, there are many 
opportunities for further research on this topic.  Many of the findings, recommendations, 
and conclusions drawn in this paper warrant dedicated and more in-depth quantitative  
analysis or consideration from different perspectives, such as inter-operability of systems, 
and application to other theaters of operations or under newly-evolving operational 
concepts. 
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What does it take for the












¾How do people behave? 
Are  their espoused values
manifested in behavior?
¾How is conflict managed?
¾What are the informal
patterns of interaction?
¾Are  there sub-cultures?




fit the larger environment?
OUTPUTS





¾ How are outputs









¾ How are outcomes
measured?
TASKS/JOBS
¾What are the basic tasks?
How formalized are they?




¾ How can the work flow be
described?
¾What are the activities in the
work flow?
¾What are the key inter-
dependencies among the
work units or activities in
the work flow?
¾What is the condition of the
physical facilities and equipment?
STRUCTURE 
¾ How to describe the structure?
¾What are the basic groupings of
activities and people?  How are 
activities/tasks combined or
departmentalized?
¾ How are the groupings integrated?








¾Who are the people? Motives, expectations, mindsets?
¾What are their knowledge, skills and abilities?
PROCESS/SUBSYSTEMS
¾ Financial Management, Measurement &Controls?
- How are people held accountable for resources?
Describe:  budgeting, control, performance
measurement, performance appraisal processes.
- Do these mechanisms of accountability produce the
desired patterns of behavior?
¾ Human Resource Management
- How do we recruit, select, retain, rotate, promote,
terminate, retire our people?  Do we have the kind of
people we need?
- How do we train and develop people and are our
current efforts adequate?  Describe: OJT, formal
training programs, team building or other 
organizational development activities, career
development.
- What is formally rewarded (both positive and 
negative rewards)?  What is the basic compensation 
package:  bonus & commissions, opportunities for
advancement, recognition & praise?  Are rewards
tied to performance assessment?
¾ Communication Information Planning and Decision 
Making
- How do we communicate?
- How do we gather, process, distribute and evaluate
Information?
- How do we plan?
- How do we make decisions?
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APPENDIX B: DEFINITION OF ACRONYMS 
ACB AMPHIBIOUS CONSTRUCTION BATTALION 
ACOS ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF 
ACSA ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENT 
AFLC AFLOAT FORCE LOGISTICS COORDINATOR 
AIT AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY 
AMC AIR MOBILITY COMMAND 
AOR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY 
APOD AERIAL PORT OF DEBARKATION 
BANZ BAHRAIN AND NEW ZEALAND 
BUMED BUREAU OF MEDICINE 
C2 COMMAND AND CONTROL 
CAPT CAPTAIN 
CDRJSOTF COMMANDER, JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE 
CVW CARRIER AIR WING 
CBMU CONSTRUCTION BATTALION MAINTENANCE UNIT 
CBU CONSTRUCTION BATTALION UNIT 
CDC CENTRAL DISTRIBUTION CENTER 
CDDOC CENTCOM DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OPERATIONS 
CENTER 
CDR COMMANDER 
CE COMMAND ELEMENT 
CENTCOM UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND 
CESE CIVIL ENGINEERING SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 
CLF COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE 
COMLOGFORNAVCENT COMMANDER, LOGISTICS FORCE U.S. NAVAL FORCES 
CENTRAL COMMAND 
CO COMMANDING OFFICER 
CONUS CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES 
COSAL CONSOLIDATED ALLOWANCE LIST 
CSSD COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT DETACHMENT 
CTF 53 COMMANDER, TASK FORCE FIVE THREE 
C2 COMMAND AND CONTROL 
DCMA DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
DEPMEDS DEPOYABLE MEDICAL SYSTEMS 
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DET DETACHMENT 
DESC-ME DEFENSE ENERGY SUPPORT CENTER – MIDDLE EAST 
DLA DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY 
DPO DISTRIBUTION PROCESS OWNER 
DOD DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
DON DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
DSCP DEFENSE SUPPLY CENTER-PHILADELPHIA 
EOD EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL 
EODGRU EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP 
EODTEU EOD TRAINING AND EVALUATION UNIT 
ESPC EXPEDITIONARY SUPPORT POLICY COUNCIL 
FHAT FLEET HOSPITAL ASSISTANCE TEAM 
FHSO FLEET HOSPITAL SUPPORT OFFICE 
FLC FORCE LOGISTICS COORDINATOR 
FLSS FORWARD LOGISTICS SUPPORT SITE 
GCSS GLOBAL COMBAT SUPPORT SYSTEM 
GOO GULF OF OMAN 
GWOT GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 
HSS HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT 
ISSA INTER-SERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENT 
IT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
ITV IN TRANSIT VISIBILITY 
JEL JOINT ELECTRONIC LIBRARY 
JFC JOINT FORCE COMMANDER 
JFMCC JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER 
JFSOCC JOINT FORCES OPERATIONAL COMPONENT COMMANDER 
JPME JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
JTLM JOINT THEATER LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT 
JV 2020 JOINT VISION 20/20 
KCIA KUWAIT CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
LAMPS LIGHT AIRBORNE MULTI-PURPOSE WEAPONS SYSTEM 
LCDR LIEUTENANT COMMANDER 
LOC LINES OF COMMUNICATION 
LOGSU LOGISTICS SUPPORT UNIT 
LRC LOGISTICS RESPONSE CENTER 
LSA LOGISTICS SUPPORT AREA 
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LSC LOGISTICS SUPPORT CENTER 
MAGTF MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE 
MARCENT MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT 
MEF MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 
MLO MATERIAL LIAISON OFFICER 
MPF MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING FORCE 
MSC MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND 
NAG NORTHERN ARABIAN GULF 
NALCC NAVAL AIR LOGISTICS COORDINATION CENTER 
NAS NORTH ARABIAN SEA 
NAVCENT U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND 
NAVELSF NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCE 
NAVSUP NAVAL SUPPLY 
NAVSUPPACT NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY 
NAVSPECWARCOM NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND 
NCD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION DIVISION 
NCF NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES 
NCFSU NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE SUPPORT UNIT 
NCR NAVAL CONSTRUCTION REGIMENT 
NFELC NAVAL FACILITIES EXPEDITIONARY LOGISTICS CENTER 
NMCB NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION 
NOLSC NAVAL OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT CENTER 
NRCC NAVAL REGIONAL CONTRACTING CENTER 
NRF NAVAL RESERVE FORCE 
NSW NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE 
NSWG NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE GROUP 
NSWTE NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE TASK ELEMENT 
NSWTG NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE TASK GROUP 
NSWTU NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE TASK UNIT 
OIC OFFICER IN CHARGE 
OIF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
OPCON OPERATIONAL CONTROL 
OPLAN OPERATIONAL PLAN 
OPORD OPERATIONAL ORDER 
OPTEMPO OPERATING TEMPO 
OSF ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS FRAMEWORK 
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PMPT PROJECT MATERIAL PLANNING AND TRACKING 
POE POINT OF EMBARKATION 
RFID RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION 
RRF READY RESERVE FORCE 
SBT SPECIAL BOAT TEAM 
SDDC SURFACE DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION COMMAND 
SDV SEAL DELIVERY VEHICLE 
SEAL SEA-AIR-LAND 
SIMLM SINGLE INTEGRATED MEDICAL LOGISTICS MANAGER 
SKC STOREKEEPER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER 
SOCCENT SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, CENTRAL COMMAND 
SOCOM UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 
SOF SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES 
SPOD SEAPORT OF DEBARKATION 
SRG SEABEE READINESS GROUP 
SSAVIE SOF SUSTAINMENT ASSET VISIBILITY AND INFO EXCHANGE 
SWA SOUTHWEST ASIA 
TACON TACTICAL CONTROL 
TAMMIS THEATER ARMY MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
SYSTEM 
TAV TOTAL ASSET VISIBILITY 
TOA TABLE OF ALLOWANCE 
TSOC THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 
USTRANSCOM UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 
UCT UNDERWATER CONSTRUCTION TEAM 
VOD VERTICAL ONBOARD DELIVERY 
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